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OHAP'l'ER I
'1'81: PROBLb

A disoussion of the faoulties of the soul should not be
without some interest to modern scholastio philosophers.
faoulty psyohology, if we may use the modern term of derision,
is the framework around whioh nearly all of soholastio psyoho1ogy is built.

Pick up almost any textbook of soho1astio

psyohology, and you will find that the whole of our psyoho1ogioa1 experience is divided and subdivided and treated under the
head of faoulties.

Vegetation, sensation, inte11eotion, vol-

ition, 10oomotion, all are oonsidered under the aspeot of faou1ties.

Modern psyoho1ogy, on the other hand, is quite oon-

sistent in its reprobation of

nfaou~ty

psyoho10gy.'

The Enoy-

olopedia Britannica in its brief artiole on this subjeot, says:
"faoulty psyoho1ogy" is the name given to
the older psyohology whioh "explained· the
various mental prooesses by referenoe to
oorresponding faoulties which exeroise
them. Although the faculty psychology has
been frequently derided from the days of
Looke onwards, it is not entirely dead,
for it still seems to haunt some of the
latest books OD PS yohology in the guise
of 'abilities.' 1
1 Enclo1opedia Britannioa, 14th ed., IX, 32
1

a
Again S.S. Oolvin in his work, The Learning Prooess, sfYs:
The faculty psyohology of the last century
is long since dead, and its resting plaoe
almost has been forgotten by the soientists
of today; its ghost, however, stalks abroad
among the masses, and its spirit still
lives in the pedagogioal theories of many
an unoritical thinker. 2
These are but samples of the widespread opprobrium heaped
upon faoulty psyohology, so widespread in faot, that "there
have been few psyohologists or educators who have not taken a
fling at its supposed absurdities."3
Sinoe faoulty psyohology then is the framework for nearly
all of Soholastio psychology and at the same time meets with
almost universal disapproval among modern non-Scholastic psychologists, investigation of this apparently sad state of
affairs does not seem to be out of plaoe.
The problem in its broadest outline seems to come to this:
Are we soholastios wrong in propounding the faoulty theory, or
are the moderns wrong in repudiating it?
verdict may be against the latter.

In some oases the

In other oases, however,

we may perhaps find that neither are wrong.

It may be that

-':- '~

what the moderns repudiate under the name of faculties,
Soholastics themselves would be the first to condemn.
2 S.S. Oolvin, The Learning process, Maomillan, N.Y., 1922,
212-213
3 O.A. Bart, Thomistic Ooncept of Mental Facultl, Oath. Univ.
of Amer., 1930, 1.

3

It is important to note here that it would be an «gversimp1ifioation of the problem to infer that all critioism of
faculty psychology is directed against the psychology of the
Scbools.

Suoh, in point of faot, is not the case.

Herbart's

oriticism of tbe faculties, for example, was directed
against the philosophy of Wolff and Kant.

~imari1y

Yet sinoe, as we have

said, faoulty psychology penetrates Soholastio psyohology almost
to the oore, any attaok on the faoulties would, apparently at
least, be a oriticism of the Soholastio position.

It will be a

point of this thesis to show, however, that such an inferenoe
is unjust, and that some oriticisms of the faoulties are entirely justified, not because they oritioize the theory as propounded by Soholastio philosophers, but beoause they critioize
adulterations of that theory.
After this rather broad view of the problem we oome now
to a statement of the speoifio purpose of the thesis.

--

It will

be to outline the dootrine of the faoulties of the soul aocording to the philosophy of St. Thomas, to present a oross-section
of the many indictments against the faoulties and faculty psychology, and to give an evaluation of these indiotments
light of the Thomistic position.

in~the

It will not,then,attempt to

prove the validity of St. Thomas' dootrine, nor will it attempt
to show the error of any opposing system.

Its purpose is

merely to investigate and present St. Thomas' position on the

faoulties,and then to examine the validity of some of ,he
objeotions against his doctrine of the faculties.
Althougb Sobolastic faoulty psyohology is not to be identified with Thomistio faoulty psyohology (for there are sohools
within Scholasticism whioh differ with St. Tbomas on tbe
dootrine of faoulties); yet, wben and if we aohieve the specific
purpose of this thesis, which is to study Thomistic faculty psychology in the light of modern opposition, we will at the same
time be throwing light on the broader problem of the relationship between Soholastic faoulty psyohology as suoh and those
same modern critics.
It is important to note at the outset that St. Thomas'
approaoh to the problem is oertainly not that of an eduoator,
nor preoisely that of a psyohologist, but predominantly that
of a metaphysioian.

He is interested prinoipally in the

ultimate oauses of our psyohio experiences.

!he modern approaoh,

on the other hand, veering away from, and even in some oases
denying the validity of metaphysios, is very largely that of
the eduoator, the eduoational psyohologist, and the empirio.l
~

psyohologist.

j

This very differenoe of approaoh is one of the

prinoiple, souroes of the misunderstanding wbich has given rise
to so muob abuse against 'faculty psyobology.·
The prooedure to be followed in aohieving the speoific
purpose of the thesis is suggested by that very purpose.

First

s
5

in order will be the outline of the Thomistic posi tiol\.

10l10w-

ing this will come the presentation of the opposing views.
loW, one source of opposi tion to the faculty theory ia the incongruity of this doctrine with the philosophical systems of
oertain modern philosophera.

Accordingly,

w. shall trace the

fortunes of the faculty theory through the philosophies of Bome
of the more prominent of the modern philosophers.

We shall in

this way see that the opposition on the part of some philosophers was demanded by the logiC of their own system of
thought.
After having traced the theory in this manner through the
.ystems of some of the modern philosophers, we shall group the
great number of objections found in later writers according to
general types and then discuss in turn each of the typical
positions.

To attempt an answer to -each individual objection

would be a wearisome and fruitless process, for, stripped of
their accidental differences, nearly all these objections turn
out to be one of three or four general categories, and for our
purpose it will suffice to handle them as such.

i

1'_.. __-----------------------------..,'
OHAPTER I I
THOMISTIO OONCEPT OF FACULTY
Faculties play so important a part in St. Thomas' notion
of tbe soul, that we find a number of references to them in his
various works.

In arranging, therefore, an outline of his

position we have not limited ourselves to references from any
ODe of his works, but have gathered them from several treatises.
st. Thomas, in the true Aristotelian fashion, is concerned
wi th the explanation of things.

The point of departure in his

philosophy is not some sort of abstract idea but the concrete
data of experienoe.

All of us, he would say, ,are conscious of

very definite and at the same time diverse psycbical phenomena.
'Ie hear, we feel, we touch, we saell, we see, (acts of external
senses); we attribute disparate sensations to the same object,
we imagine, we remember, we have instinctive acts, (acts of
internal senses); we think, we Will, we have intellectual
memory, (acts of intellectual faculties).

low what is the

principle, the origin, the cause of these conscious experiences?
Let us be more specific.

I inhale the sweet perfume of a

delicately scented rose.

What within me produces this activity?

We presc1nd here from the odor as partial cause, and consider
6

-'_.-----------------------------I"'"
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only the subjeotive oause.

Does this sensation of smell oome

from the soul direotly, from a faoulty, from the suppositum
(we are told: aotiones Bunt suppositorum)?
tinguish.

Soholastios dis-

My act of sensing the delioate perfume of the rose

bas a fourfold prinCiple.

There is the remote principle which,

(prinoipium quod remotum) acts, and that is the suppositum.
am the one who smells the rose.

I

Then there is the proximate

Erinciple which (principium quod proximum) acts, and that is
the sensorium.

My nose is the proximate principle which smells.

Again there is the remote principle by which (principium quo
remotum) I aot, and that is the soul or vital prinoiple.

It is

by means of the sensitive power of my soul that I smell the
rose.

Lastly, there is a proximate prinoiple by whioh

(principium quo proximum) I aot, and that is the faoulty.
smell by reason of my smelling

facul~y,

I

or sense of smell.

Now the problem that confronts us is just this;- what
preCisely is this principium quo

proximu~,

this faoultl, and

how does it differ, if at all, from the soul itself, the prinoipium quo remotum?

Are the different faculties nothing but
...

~

the soul itself looked at from the point of view of its different activities?

Or are the faculties entities really distinot

from the soul; not independent from the soul, it is true, but
really distinot entities inhering in the soul, through whioh

pi

8

the soul aots?

In other words, are the faoultles only'.ration-

ally distinot from the soul, or are they really distinot from
it, as

~

from £!!?

And if they are really distlnot, are they

distinot as substanoe from substanoe, as, for example, one book
from another; or as substanoe from aocident, as redness from a
red book?
There are, as St. Thomas says, some who think that the
faculties are nothing other than the essenoe of the soul itself,
considered under the aspect of its dlfferent operations.

In

the Questio Disputata de Splrituallbua Oreaturls, under
Artlcle II, he remarks:
Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt
potentias anlmae non esse allud quam ipsam
eius essentiam, ita quod una et eadem
essentia animae, secundum quod est pr1no1p1um sensit1vae operation1s, dicitur
sensus; seoundum vero quod est 1ntellectualis operation18 prino1plum, dio1tur
1ntelleotus, et sic de a1ii8. Et ad hoo
praecipue vldentur moti fulsse, ut
Avlcenna d1c1t, propter s1mplicitatem
animae •••• Sedlhaeo pos1tio est oanino
1mpossib11is.
Aga1n, in his Quaestl0 D18putata de Ant.a, under Artlole 12,
"

,

·Utrum an1ma slt suae potent1ae,· he says:
Ponentes 19ltur, quod anlma sit suae
potentiae, hoc'intelligunt, quod 1psa
essent1a animae sit pr1ncipium immediatum
omnium operat10num animae; dioentes quod
homo per essentiam ani mae intel11g1t,
sent1t, et alia hulusmodl operatur, et
1 S. Thomas Aquinas, ~uaestlones D18¥utatae, Mariettl, TaurinlRomae, 1931, Vol. I , De Spiritual bus oreaturis, a.l1, oorp.

p
9

[essentia animae] secundum diversitatem
operationum, diversia nominibus nominatur;
aensus qu1dem in quantum est principium
sentiendi, intellectua autem in quantum
eat intelligendi principium, et sic de·
ali1s •••• S8d haec opinio stare non potest. a

.'

These two quotations make it amply clear that for St. Thomas
the faculties were certainly something other than the mere
essence of the soul.

So far, however, he has only affirmed

that such a doctrine is impossible.

Does he adduoe any

arguments to ahow such a position impossible?
cidedly ao.

He does; de-

Of the arguments he proposed, we shall note

firstly, the one he seems to insist on most strongly.

It comes

to this: an act is in the same order of being as the potency to
which it is ordained.

Thus if the act is an accident, the

potency too is an aooident; if a substance, the potency too is
a substance.

But the act in this c&se,--the operations of the

soul,--is an accident, for only in God are the operatiOns and
the substanoe one (in solo Deo est operatio eius substantia).
Sinoe therefore, in all creatures the operations are accidents,
so too are the potencies.

Therefore, the potenoies or faculties

are aocidents, and not part of the substance or essence of the
soul.

Now let us hear St. Thomas:
Respondeo dioendum quod impossible est dicere
quod essentia animae sit eius potentia; lioet
hoc quid em posuerint; et hoc duplioiter ostenditur •••• Primo, quia cum potentia et actus
dividant ens, et quodlibet genus entis, oportet

a S. Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones
Romae 1931

Vol. II

De Anima

Dis~utatae,.Karietti,

a.~,

oorp.

Tourini-

#
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quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et
aotus; et ideo, si actus non est in genere
8ub8tantiae, potentia quae dic1tur ad
ilIum actum, non pote8t esse in genere
substantiae. Operatio autem animae non
est in genere 8ubstantiae, sed in 8010 Deo
operatio est eius substantia. UDde Dei
potentia quae est operationis principium,
est ipsa Dei essentia; quod non potest esse
verum neque in anima, neque in aliqua
oreatura •••••• 3

.'

Let us now add a few of the subsidiary arguments given by St.
Thomas.
Impossible apparet (quodessentia animae
sit suae potentiae) hoc speoiali ratione
in anima •••• Primo quidem quia essentia
una est, in potentiis autem oportet ponere
multitudinem propter diversitatem aotuum
et objectorum. Oportet enim potentias
seoundum actus d1!ersifioar1, cum potentia
ad aotum dioatur.
The oonclusion

th~refore

i8 evident: the soul i8 one; the

faculties or potentiae are many.
identified.

Therefore, they cannot be

St. Thomas goes on:

Apparet idem ex ord1ne potentiarum animae,
et habitudine earum ad invicem; invenitur
enim quod una aliam movet, siout ratio
irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et intellectus voluntatem; quod esse non potest
si omnes potentiae e8sent ipsa animae
essentia, quia idem~ecundem idem non movet
8eipsum, ut pro bat Philosophus. Relinquitur
ergo quod potent1ae animae non sunt ipsa
eius essentia. 5

+~

3 S. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Marietti, Taurin1, 1937,
Tom. I, I, q. 77, a. 1, corp. of. also q. 79, a. 1, corp.,
q. 54, a. l, corp., q. 54, a. 3, corp., Sent. l, d18t. 5,
q. IV, a. 2.
4 Aqu1na8, De Spir1tual1bus Oreat18, a.ll, corp.
5 Ibid.
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The faculties then are not identical with the soul.

But

if they are not identical with the soul, they must be distinct.
If they are distinct they are either substances or accidents.
They cannot be substances, as we have already shown, for as
potencies they are in the same order of being as their corresponding acts.
accidents.

But the corresponding acts are, as we have shown,

Therefore, the potencies or faculties too must be

accidents; accidents inhering in the soul alone in the case of
the purely spiritual or inorganic faculties, or in th.e composite in the case of the organic faculties.

Let us hear St.

Thomas on this point:
Ion enim inter substantiam et accidens
potest esse aliquid medium, cum substantia et accidens dividant ens per
affirmationem et negatio,nem; oum proprium substantiae sit non esse in subjecto, accidentis vera sit in subjecto
esse. Unde si potentiae animae non sunt
ipsa essentia animae (et manifestum est
quod non sunt aliae substantiae) sequitur
quod sunt accidentia in aliquo novem
generum contenta. Sunt enim in secunda
specie qualitatis, quae dicitur potentia
vel impotentia naturalis. 6
Oonsidered thus from the viewpoint of the praedicaments, the
faoulties are aCCidents, qualities.

Considered however,

f~~m

the viewpoint of the praedicables, they are, as St. Thomas goes
on to say, in the same article, ·proprietates naturales vel
essentiales, id est essentiam animae naturaliter consequentes."

,

6 Ibid.
? Ibid.

-

.1

p
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Let us noW draw together what we have so far

see~~

The

faculties are not the essence of the soul considered merely
under different aspects, but are realities distinot from, though
not independent of, the soul.
inhering in the soul.

They are aocidents, qualities

They are proprietates naturales, whioh

though not part of the essence, follow naturally from the
essence of the soul.
Let us here note for future reference, with what degree
of certitude St. Thomas holds this thesis of the real distinction between the soul and its faculties.

Now the two

opinions, namely, a real distinction and the absence of a real
distinotion, are oontradictory positions.

If then the Angelio

Dootor says that the opinion opposed to his nest omnino impossibiliS,n 8 or that ·stare non potest,n9 we may safely infer, I think, that he held his position as certain.
We have so far been disoussing the nature of the faoulties,
What they are; let us oonsider now how they operate, how they

!2!!.

Do they operate of their own right, independently of the

soul?

If not, how do they operate?

Does the soul, as prime

mover, so to speak, work through them, by means of them?
Soiendum quod potentia nihil aliud est quam
prinoipium operationi. alicuius, sive sit
actio sive passio; non quidem prinoip1um
8 Ibid.
9 Aquinas, De Anima, a.12, corp.

Pi
13
quod est subjeotum agens aut patiens; sed 10.'
id quo agens agit, aut patiens patitur ••••
From this it beoomes olear that, as Father Maher so well
says,
A mental power or faoulty is not •••• an independent reality (note that he does not
say it is not a distinct reality, but that
it is not an independent reality], a
separate agent, whioh originates oonsoioUfl
states out of itself apart from the mind.
That gives us some idea of how the faoulties do not operate.
How then do they operate?
opera tiona of the soul?

What is their funotion in the
Again let us hear at. Thomas:

Ion quidem (est faoultas) prinoipium quod
est subjeotum agens'aut patiens, sed id
quo agens agit, aut patiena patitur,
siout ars aedifioativa est potentia in
aedifioatore, qui per eam aedifioatj et
oalor in igne, qui oalore oalefaoit; et
siooum est potentia in lignis, quia
seoundum hoo sunt oombustibilia. 12
Aooordingly we may with rather Siwek say:
Ex diotis apparet potentias operativas
animae aequiparari posse instrumentis,
quibus artista utitur in opere suo
perfioiendo; at baeo instrumefta sunt
naturaliter animae ooniunota. 3
Likewise rather Oaloagno tells us in his exoellent treatment of
the faoulties, that the aotion of the soul and its faoulties is
10 Ibid.
11 K. Kaher, S.J., Psyohology, 9th edition, Longmans, London,
1933, 36.
12 Aquinas, De Anima, a.12, oorp.
13 P. Siwek, a.J., PSlohologia Ketaphysioa, Univ. Gregoriana,

p

not a double aoti·on, one part of whioh prooeeds from

~e

faoulty

itself, the other from the soul; but that there is but one
single aotion prooeeding at onoe from both the soul and the
faoulty, just as the aot of painting is one aot that prooeeds
alike from the painter and from his brush.
(raoultates) se habent ad modum instrumenti,
quod agit quidem, sed aotione quae per
prius est a oausa principali. Unde sicut
non proprie penicillus pingit, sed homo per
penicillum, ita non proprie intelleflus
oogitat, sed anima per intellectum.
All along we have been speaking of faoulties, assuming
that there is more than one faoulty.
is not gratuitous.

The assumption, however,

St. Thomas holds that there is a plurality

of faoulties,15 and says that they are distinguished one from
. another by their aots and objects--Distinguuntur per aotus et
objeota.

'or, as we know, a potenoy i8 essentially orda1ned

to its aot, in suoh wise that the potenoy is known only insofar
as its aot is known.

Again, an aot is always ordained to some

objeot, material objeot in vegetative and sensitive life, immaterial in intelleotual life.

The objeot, of oourse, that

distinguishes the aot is the formal object, for the same

+~

material object, for example, our sweet red rose, may oause two
specifioally different aots--the aots of smelling and of seeing
14

r.x.

Oalcagno, S.J., Philosophia Soholast1oa, K. d'Auria,
Heapoli, 1937, II, 17.
15 Aquinas, S.T., I, q. 77, a. B.

I

__
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------------------------------------------------15
and,benoe,oould not be said to differentiate the

facul~ies.

The faculties,then,are distinguished proximately by their acts,
but remotely by the formal objeots.

Here is the way St. Thomas

puts it:
Respondeo dioendum quod potentia seoundum
lllud quod est potentia ordinatur ad aotum.
Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex
actu ad quem ordinaturj et per oonsequens
oportet quod ratio potentiae diversifloatur,
ut dlversifioatur ratio actus. Ratio autem
actus diversifioatur seoundum diversam
rationem objeoti; omnis enim actl0 vel est
potentiae activae vel passivae. Objeotum
autem comparatur ad aotum potentiae passivae
slcut prinoiplum et oausa moven8; ••••• Ad
aotum autem potentiae activae oomparatur
objeotum ut terminus et finis ••• Ex hi8
autem duobus actio speoiem reoipit, soilioet
ex principio, vel ex termino ••••.• Unde
neOesse est quod potentiae diversifioentur
seoundum aotus et objecta. lS
There are different faoulties then, whioh are distinguished
one from another by their formal objects.
concrete are these faoulties?

But what in the

In other Words, how does St.

Thomas olasslfy them?
There are, first of all, three klnds of souls, vegetative,
sensitlve, and intelleotual; and the faoulties may oorrespond1!- ;-

ingly be divided into the vegetative, sensitive and intelleotual
faoultles. 1 ? The basis of this division is the degree in whioh
the operations of the soul surpass the operations of natural
bodies.

16

Another division, more detailed than the first,

i~

the

division according to the five genera of faculties,--the
vegetative, sensitive, intelleotual, appetitive and locomotive
faculties.

The basis of division in this case is the univer-

sality of the object and the manner by which the soul attains
it. 1S
At this juncture a question may arise as to the unity of
the soul.

If the faculties are entities really distinct from

the soul, how can the soul be said to be one?

We answer that

a thing is one, or more than one, by reason of its substance.
There exist two units, two una per se, only where there exist
two complete substances.

Now the faculties are aooidents or

propria, and as such do not form part of the essence or substance of the soul.

Acoordingly,they may be distinct between

themselves and from the soul without oausing any distinction
in the substanoe of the soul, and without therefore, destroying
the soul's unity.
Such,then,in sketchy form are some of the main points of
St. Thomas' doctrine on the faculties.

According to that

~r

doctrine, the faculties are not merely ways of classifying the
different psychic phenomena produced by the soul; they are
re~lities,

really distinct from the soul, yet not so distinct

as to be independent of the soul either in being or in operation
18 Ibid., q. 78, a. 1.

.'
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They are accidents inhering in the soul, qualities of the soul,
proprietates naturales, which the soul uses as quasi-instruments
in the production of psychio acts.

The faoulties do not hear,

see, feel, think, will, and so on, but the soul by and through
the faculties produces these aots.

The faoulties are dis-

tinguished from one another by reason of tbeir formal objects,
and may be classified into vegetative, sensitive, and intelleotual faoulties aocording as their operations surpass the operations of natural bodies, or into vegetative, sensitive, intelleotual, appetitive or looomotive, according to the division
of the five

g~nera

of faculties.

That, in brief summary, we

may say is the Thomistio doctrine of the faoulties.

p

.'
CHAP'l'IR

III

FACULTY OONCEPT FRO¥ OCCAM TO LEIBNITZ
Having oompleted the disoussion of the faoulties aooording
to the philosophy of St. Thomas, we are faced noW with the
problem of traoing the fortunes of this theory through the
maze of philosophic thought sinoe his time.

Of the various

possible ways of oonducting this investigation, we Will, as
noted above, use the following:

first, we will oonsider

separately some of the more prominent of the early modern
philosophers., to see what plaoe was aooorded to the faoul ty
theory in their philosophy.

Secondly, since there is a super-

abundance of material relative to our problem to be found in
the writings of the more reoent modern psyohologists and
thinkers, it will be more to our purpose to oategorize the
matter they present, and then to handle oollectively the
material found in eaoh oategory.

This, aooordingly, is the

course we shall pursue.
The first major diversion from the dootrine of· the
faoulties as presented by St. Thomas Was that offered by the
Nominalists under the leadership of William of Oooam.

Tbough

lominalism did not limit itaelf to the field of psychology but
18
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permeated through the whole field of philosophy, it coftcerns us
only insofar as it vitiates the Thomistio oonoept of the
faoulty.

Aooording to the nominalists, the faculties had not

real existenoe.
nomina.

They were not entia realia; they were merely

They were nothing more than mere names aooording to

whioh we may conveniently classify mental phenomena.

Pirotta

clearly and succinctly analyzes their position:
Prima sententia quamlibet distinotionem
praeter nominal em sive conceptualem seu
ex modo significandi, negat, quatenus
scilioet ipsa animae essentia est per
seipsam proximum prinoipium operationum,
at ideo eadem essentia animae quia intelligit, dicitur vel significatur ut
intelleotus, quia vult, voluntas, etc.,
oonsequenter potentiae non sunt nisi
nomina. Ita .ominalistae ••• l
Dessoir in his discussion of Occam's psyohology makes a somewhat similar statement.

He says:

He is throughout opposed to a multiplicity
of distinot faculties, and limits the
notion to that of a multiplicity of
directions in whioh the soul is aotive. 2
This attitude toward the faculties attributed to Ocoam deserves
special attention, for it is a vieWpoint which is predominant
in nearly the whole of subsequent non-soholastic thought onrthe
problem.

Pirotta marks well this faot, wben, in oonolusion to

the passage quoted above, he states:
1 A.M. Pirotta, O.P., Summa Philosophiae, Karii E. Marietti,
Taurini, 1936, II, 439-440.
2 K. Dessoir, Outlines of the History of Psychology, Kacmillan,
Bew York, 1912, 70.
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Ita N'ominalistae tum antiqui ••• tum moderni, .'
quibua plures alii, auis doctrinis cohaerentes, adbaerent, ut Oartesius et Oartesiani,
Ocoasionalistae (v.g. Malebranche), Empiristae \Locke, Taine) Pseudo-Intellectualistae ~v.g. Leibnitz~, Phenomenalistae (v.g.
Kant et lantiani), Pantheistae (v.g.
Spinoza), Transcendentalisll! (v.g.
Schelling, Hegel), Dynamistae-psychici (v.g.
Berbart, Beneke, Lindner), Rosmini, Galluppi,
Gerdil et Garnier. 3
For a refutation of this positi0nt namely, that the
faculties are only names or group concepts for the activities
of the soul, we need only turn to the preceding chapter where
we will find St. Thomas' explicit treatment of this matter.
He emphatically denies that the faculties are merely the soul
itself considered from the viewpoint of its various activities,
and states with proof that they are real accidental entities
inhering in the essence of the soul.

Suarez also disposes of

the Nominalists,though not with quite the same dispatoh.
Potentiae quae ad has (vi tales) operationes
ordinantur, distinguuntur ex natura rei ab
ipsa anima. 1st contra N'ominales, et videtur certa. 4
The Nominalistic or even Oonceptualistic viewpoint of
faoulties 18 very common among psyohologists of the reoent
century.

It even constitutes for one author, Sir William

~

Hamilton, a means of defense against the oritics who accuse the

3 Pirotta, 440.
4 Francis Suarez, S.J., Opera Omnia, Ludovicum Vives, Paria,
1856, Vol. 3, De Anima, II, o. 1, n. 4.
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faculties of being

ISO

many distinct and independent a5ist-

ene es • 15
We pass noW from Ocoam and the Nominalists to the early
modern philosophers.

Undoubtedly the first big name on the

list of modern non-soholastio philosophers is that of Franois
Bacon. It has been said 6 that Baoon i8 to be judged rather on
the method whioh he inaugurated than on the oontent of his
system.

Oertainly his content relative to the faoulties

differs little, if at all, from the traditional soholastic
vieW.

In the third ohapter of the fourth book of De Augmentis

Scientiarum, he aa18:
Secunda igitur partitio (ciroa animam humanam)
fit, in dootrinam de substantia et faoultatibus animae, et d~otrinam de uau et
objectia faoultatum.
From thia it seema we oan conolude

t~t,implioitely

at least,

he distinguishes between the substanoe and the faoulties of the
soul; henoe they are not identical.

Moreover, he seems like-

wise to 'differentiate between the faculty and its use or
function; henoe they are not merely names to designate the

5 Sir William Hamilton, Leotures on Metaphisics and Logio,
Gould & Linooln, Boaton, 1868, I, 267-27 , oir. esp.
pp. 268-269.
6 W. Turner, History of PhilosOphy, Ginn, New York, 1929, 437.
7 Francis Baoon, The Works of Franois Baoon, London, 1740,
Vol. I, De Augmentis Sci ent iarum, Bk. IV, o. 3, 132.

aa
••rio US functions of the soul, for If they were

merely~ntended

to be names for the functions, they certainly would not be used
to designate the principles from which the functions flow, as
the above quotations seem to indloate that they are.
That such deductions are not merely Implicit In his work,
.ut tbat he held a variety of faculties, and that, If not
tully satisfied, he was at least concerned about the nature of

tbeir distinction from the soul, we may gather from the followiag:

Faoultates autem anlmae notlsslmae sunt;
intelleotus, ratio, phantasla, memoria,
appetltus, voluntas; denique unlversae
illae, circa quas versantur scientlae
logloae et ethicae: Sed In dootrlna de
anima origines ips arum traotarl debent,
idque physioe, prout animae lnnatae sint,
et lnbaereant: usus tantum ips&rum, et
objecta, i1lis alteris artibus deputantur. 8
It is interesting to note in this connection Bacon's use of
the subjunctive mood in the phrase 'prout innatae !!ai et !!baereant."

In the doctrine of the soul, he says, the origin

of the faculties ought to be Investigated, as they may be

innate and adhering in the soul.

Aooordingly, Bacon does not

aeem to be quite so certain as St. Thomas about the nature of
the faculties and their relationship to the soul.
It seems, therefore, that we oan say without fear of overatatement that Baoon's philosophy of the nature of the

-• Bacon

Bk. IV

o. 3, 133.
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facul ties when compared with tbat of later philosopher.',
follows olosely enough the Thomistio tradition.
Although, chronologioally speaking, Baoon may be oonsidered the first in importanoe among modern non-scholastic
philosophers, yet from the viewpoint of his influenoe on the
whole trend of modern philosophy, Desoartes undoubtedly holds
first rank among all modern philosophers.

Oertainly his views

regarding the problem under disoussion are of prime importanoe,
not beoause of any astounding revolution he inauguxated in the
dootrine of the faoulties, but beoause, by his dootrine of the
soul, and of the oomplete independenoe of the soul in its
aotivity from the body, he prepared the ground for exoessive
subjeotive ideali8m on the one hand and gross materialism on
the other, both of whioh extremes, reduotively, have had great
influenoe on the question of the faoulties.
In order to understand wbat Desoartes thought oonoerning
the faoulties, it is first neoessary for us to get a glimpse
at what he considered to be the nature of the mind, for on his
view of the nature of the mind will depend in large measur&-',
his view conoerning the nature of the mind's faculties.
low the word substanoe, Desoartes says, may be attributed
univooally to soul and body, and the prinoipal property of
eaoh oonstitutes its essenoe.

But sinoe thought is the prin-

oiple 'Pl"operty of the thinking substanoe, and extension the
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prinoiple property of oorporeal substanoe, thought and.extension oonstitute the essenoe of mind and body respeotively.9
The immediate oonsequence of this is that thought and mind
are not at all two things, but if distinct at all, are only
rationally distinot.

And indeed we cannot accuse Descartes

here of any want of logic, for he says:
For we experience some diffioulty in
abstraoting the notions that we have of
substanoe from those of thought or extension, for they in truth
not differ but
in thought (ratione) ••• l

80

If, then, thought constitutes the essence of the soul's substance, what relation Will the other aotivities of the mind
(such as memory, immagination, volition) have to the soul.
These aotivities, he states quite logically, are different
types or modes of thought.

• ••• everything that we find in mind

is but so many diverse forms of thinking.Hll
With mind then in reality identical with thought, and
with all the mental activity considered as modes or variations
of thought, it would be relatively safe to conclude without
further inquiry into his writings that he held that the mind
9 Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trl.
by E.S. Haldane & G.R.T. Ross, University Press, Oambridge,
1931, Principles of PhilosophY, Part I, Princ. LIII, Vol. I,
240, and also Princ. LXIII, Vol. I, 245.
10 Ibid., Part I, Princ. LXIII, Vol. I, 248.
11 Ibid., Part I, Princ. LIII, Vol. I, 240, Princ. LXV, Vol. I,
248.
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and the one fao.ul ty of thought are one and the same thing.

We

are not surprised then when we read:
••• no one before me, so far as I know,
asserted that mind oonsisted in one thin~
alone, namely the faoulty of thinkiAf an
the inward souroe (so. of thinking). 2
Bow, when Desoartes speaks of the faoulty of thought, he
does not use the term in the Thomistio sense of a potenoy that
can be aotuated.

For, aooording to Desoartes, the essenoe of

the mind is its aot of thinking, and it is this oontinuous aot
or prooess of thinking that he loosely denominates a faoulty.
In one plaoe at least Desoartes dropped a remark on what
he thought of the prevailing dootrine of faoulties.
seoond part of his treatise on

The~as~ions

In the

of the Soul, after

having given his enumeration of the various passions, he gives
his reason why he is differing in his enumeration from those
who preoeded him:
Here we have the order whioh seemB to me
to be the best for the enumeration of the
passions. In this I know well that I am
parting oompany with all those who have
written on this subjeot before, but it is
not without great reason that I do so.
For these derive their enumeration from
the faot that they distinguish in the
sensitive part of the soul two appetites
whioh they name the oonoupisoent and the
irasoible respeotively. And beoause in
the soul I reoognize no distinotion of
parts, as I bave said above, this seems
to me to signify nothing but that it has
two faoulties, the one of desire, and the

"

12 Desoartes, Notes Direoted Against A Certain Programme, eto.,
Note 1. Vol. I ~4.

-

2S

other of anger, and because in the same
.'
way it has the faculties of wondering,
loving, hoping, fearing, and thus of receiving in itself every other passion •••
I do not see why they have desired to
refer them all to concupiscence or anger. 13
If we were to paraphrase this statement, it would seem that his
thought would run something like this:

·Preceeding enumerations

of the passions divided them into faculties of desire (concupiscible) and anger (irascible).

In that case we should also

have faculties of love, hope, fear, etc., for they are as much
passions as are anger and desire.

But that would be putting

in the soul a plurality of faculties.

Now a plurality of

faculties would involve a distinction of parts in the soul.
Therefore, since I recognize in the soul no distinction of
parts, such an enumeration is unsatisfactory.·
It is not at all difficult to see then that Descartes'
pOSition differs radically from the Thomistic doctrine.

For

in the ThomistiC doctrine the faculties are not activities,
but potencies; the faculties are not limited to one so called
"faculty: and the plurality that does exist does not involve
a distinction of parts in the soul, for they are not

identi~1ed

with the essence of the soul, but are qualities really distinct
from the soul's essence.
13 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, Part II, Art. LXVIII,
Vol. I, 361-362.
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To sum up then: the soul or mind according to

Des~artes

is thought, and all other types of mental activity axe but
~odes

of thought.

This activity, which Descartes in misleading

fashion calls the faculty of thOught, constitutes the essence
of the soul.

More than one "faculty" i8 impossible, for to

posit in the soul any further "faculties" would be to place in
it a distinction of parts, a thing which, of course, he would
not permit.
In any attempt to evaluate the dootrine of Desoartes al
compared With that of St. Thomas, it is important to remember
that Desoartes' approach was predominantly epistomologioal,
whereas the Thomistio approaoh is predominantly metaphysical.
Since the approaches are different it is difficult to evaluate
one in terms of the other.

Nevertheless some evaluation can

be made.
Oertainly it is untenable to identify soul with thought
merely beoause we can knoW of the soul's substance only by
knowing its act of thinking.

Surely a person who is unconscious

through siokness or aocident is not deprived of his mind because
there is a suspension of all thought.

Yet that would have to

be the oonolusion, if we identify the mind's substanoe with its
act of thinking.

To this objeotion Desoartes answers:

But Why should it not always think, when it
is a thinking substance? Why is it strange
that we do not remember the thoughts it has

88

had when in the womb or in a stupor, when
.'
we do not even remember the most of those
we know we have had when grown up, in good
health, and awake? For the recollection
of the thoughts which the mind has had during
the period of its union with the body, it
is neoessary for certain traoes of them to
be impressed on the brain; and turning and
applying itself to these the mind remembers.
Is it remarkable if the brain of an infant
or of one in a stupor is unfit to reoeive
these residual impressions?
The immediate conolusion from this pOSition, namely, that
the mind is a thinking substanoe, or, in other words, that the
act of thinking is the essenoe of the mind, should be that the
mind is the pure aot of thought.

Acoording to Thomistic meta-

physics, this is olearly impossible in a created being, for
only God is the Pure Aot of Thought.
As for Descartes' classifioation of all our prinoiple
mental acts as different "modes" of thought, we oertainly
oould agree with him, if we were to change the word "thought"
to "consoiousness" or "awareness"; for oertainly, if we exolude the mysterious operations of the subconsoious mind, there
is a oonoomitant oonsciousness or awareness to all our mental
acts.

Henoe all our mental acts are "modes," so to speak, of

"oonsoiousness," or in Desoartes' terminology, "thought."

Now

there is definite evidence to support the hypotheSiS that
lawareness" or 'consoiousness" is what Descartes meant by
"thought."

For he says:

14 Descartes, Reply to Fifth Objections, Ked. II, n. 4, Vol. II,
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By the word thought I understand all that
of whioh we are oonsoious as operating in
us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing, imagining, but also frlling,
are here the same thing as thought.

.'

Nevertheless it still remains true that oonsoiousness or awareness do not oonstitute the essenoe of mind as they seem to do
for Desoartes.
In conclusion then, it seems safe to say that the Oartesian
and Thomistic oonoept of faculty were diametrically opposed.
For St. Thomas the faoulties are the proximate principles of
oonsoious activity, inherent in the soul, and distinot from the
soul as aooidents from substanoe.

Desoartes thought otherwise.

For him the operations of the souloould be reduoed to one
activity, thought, whioh he misleadingly oalled a faoulty,
but whioh in reality was for him identioal with the soul, i.e.,
oonstituting its essence.

Hence, the concept of faculty in the

Thomistic sense was non-existent in the philosophy of Desoartes.
The psychology of Baruch Spinoza, the next great figure
after Descartes in the evolution of modern philosophy, is noteworthy here largely beoause of the similarity of his doctrine
with that of Descartes, and because he has brought more clearly
into focus some of the psychological prinCiples enunciated by
Descartes.

Wallace, in his work on Hegel, remarks that in the

philosophy of Spinoza, -The ideas !r! the mind: mind does not
15 BBlcartesJ Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Princ. IX, VOl.I,
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~ ideas,R16 and • ••• the faoulties as suoh are no be~ter than

entia rationis.,17

Though these remarks savor of the philosophy

of Desoartes, they were made, as we said, in referenoe to the
psyohology of Spinoza.
As in the oase of Desoartes, so in that of Spinoza, if we
wish to oome to an understanding of his position with regard
to the faoulties, it is important first of all, and for obvious
reasons, to understand bis ooncept

of~.

For Descartes, as

we saw, that whioh constitutes the mind is its principle
property, thought.

Spinoza 1s even more explicit; for him the

actual being of the mind is its idea.

In the second part of

his Ethios, on the Nature and Origin of the Kind, we find him
saying:

"Therefore the first part which oonstitutes the actual

being of the human mind is the idea of an individual thing
aotually existing.R18

Now that individual thing, the idea of

which constitutes the human mind is the body.

"Therefore the

objeot of the idea constituting the human mind is the body and
that actually existing.H19

That he really considered tbe idea

of the body as constituting the

~,

is beyond doubt, for in

16 W. Wallaoe, Hegel's PhilosophY of Mind, Olarendon, Oxford,
1894, 58.
17 Ibid., 58.
18 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Part 2, Prop. XI, trl. by A. Boyle,
Dutton, New York, 1930, 46.
19 Ibid., Prop. XIII, 47.
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another plaoe he used the two terms, idea of the body

~d

the mind as synonyms.SO
Since, then, the mind is an idea, or, as he says elsewhere,Sl "a fixed and determined mode of thinking," it would
seem logical to infer that willing, whioh is an activity of the
mind, must be a form

of~.

position, for he says:

And that is precisely Spinoza's

"And what we have said of this volition

(for it was seleoted at random) can be said of any other
volition, namely, that it is nothing but an idea. n2S

And again

in even more unmistakable terms he identifies idea and volition,
intellect and will.
Will and intellect are nothing but individual
volitions and ideas. But an individual volition and idea are one and the same thing.
Therefore Wail and intellect are one and the
same thing.
The conolusions that we oan draw with regard to Spinoza's
view of the faoulties are obvious.

If the mind

~

its idea,

the idea ceases to be oonsidered a product of the mind.

Henoe,

any notion of a faoulty as the proximate principle in the produotion of an idea is obviously ruled out.

Prop.
21 ~., Prop.
22 Ibid., Prop.
23 Ibid., Prop.
20

~.,

XXI, 58.
XLVIII, 74.
XLIX, 76.
XLIX, 76.

Again, if volition

.

'
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is the same as intellection, (or to put it more ooncretely, if
an act of the will is but an idea), and the mind is identified
with its idea, then there is no room for a faculty of will.
Therefore, we are not surprised when we read:

"There is not

in the mind an absolute faoulty of willing and unwilling, but
only individual volitions ••• "24 That disposes of the will as
a faculty; what about the intelleot?
In the same manner it may be shown that
there oannot be found in the mind an
absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc. Whenoe it follows
that these and such like faculties are
either entirely fictitious, or nothing
els8 than metaphysical or general
entities, which we are wont to form
from individual things: therefore intelleot or will have reference in the
same manner to this or that idea, or to
this or that volition, as "stonenes8" to
this
that stone, or man to Peter or
Paul.

is

Faoulties, acoordingly, are one of two things:

they are

either "entirely fiotitious" somethings, .2.£. "metaphysioal or
general entities whioh we are wont to form from individual
things;' that is, universal ooncepts.
Xow Spinoza would certainly seem to be justified in cortsidering the faculties entirely fictitious, for if the mind is
an idea, it would surely need no faculty to form its idea.

24
25

~.,

~.,

Prop. XLIX, 75.
Prop. XLVIII, 75.
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That would be putting a power of the mind prior to the 4 mind,-manifestly absurd.

Perhaps, however, in view of the prevailing

tradition, to oall the faoulties "entirely fiotitious" might
have seemed to Spinoza to be rather abrupt; so he is willing
to oonoede that if they are not utterly fiotitious, then they
are at best "metaphysioal or general entities whioh we are wont
to form from individual things."

Thus, he says, "intelleot"

••• has "referenoe to this or that idea, or (will) to this or
that volition, as 'stoneness' to this or that stone, or man to
Peter or Paul."

Here we see in its full vigor the nominalistio

or oonoeptualistio viewpoint of faoulty, a view that is, as we
said above, very prominent in the whole of modern nonsoholastio psyohology, and one whioh is entirely inoonsistent
with St. Thomas' oonolusions.

For St. Thomas, the faoulties

are not merely names or oonoepts, but aotually existing realities inhering as aooidents in the substantial soul.
It is evident that the faoulties are ruled out of the
psyohology of Spinoza, not beoause of any flaws he found in
the dootrine as proposed by St. Thomas, but because faoulties
are inoonsistent with his theory of the nature of the mind.
Sinoe Spinoza identified the substance of the mind with its
idea, there is obviously no plaoe in his psyohology for a
faoulty as a proximate prinoiple of an aot distinot from the
mind.

Destroy or ohange the nature of "the soul, and, of oourse,

ou destro

e the nature of the soul's faoulties.
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In our approaoh to the dootrine of the faoulties

~oording

to the philosophy of John Looke, it will not be neoessary for
us first to enter upon a disoussion of his theory of mind in
order to understand his position with regard to the faoulties,
for on the question of faoulties he is very explioit.

Very

little, if any, interpretation of his general psyohologioal
theories is required in order to arrive at a rather olear understanding of what he thought of faoulties.
Strangely enough, when the present writer was beginning
his investigation of the problem, it seemed rather apparent
from the oitations read that Looke was to be a fruitful souroe
of material for the side of the opposition.

Thus BaldWin, in

his Diotionary of PhilosophY and PSYOhology26 leaves the reader
under the distinot impression that Looke is an aroh-enemy of
faoulty psyohology. Stout 27 and Muller-Freienfels 28 present
Looke in similar fashion.

Spearman also, although a very

generous defender of the faoulty dootrine, leaves one with the
same impression; namely, that Looke is an antagonist of the
dootrine of the faculties. 29 So far i8 this from being the
26 J.Y. BaldWin, Diotionar~ of PhilosophY and Psyohology,
Yacmillan, New York, 19~, 369.
27 G.r. Stout, Manual of Psyohology, Hinds, New York, 1899, 105.
28 R. Muller-rreienfel8, Evolution of Modern Psyohology, Yale,
New Haven, 1935, 292.
29 O. Spearman, Psyohology Down The Ages, Maomillan, London,
1937, I, 184.
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case, that anyone who reads more than a few detatched sentences
will see olearly that Looke is not only a "faculty psyohologist"
himself, but also goes to great pains to free it from the
absurdities which might be attaohed to it at the bands of those
not oareful in their use of terms.
First of all Looke definitely olaims existence for the two
principal faculties of "understanding" and "will."
The two great and prinoipal actions of the
mind which are most frequently oonsidered,
and which are so frequent that everyone
that pleases may take notioe of them in
himself, are these two: perception or
thinking, and volition or willing. The
power of thinking is oalled "the understanding" and the power of volition is
oalled "the will;" and these two powers
or abilities in the mind are denominated
" facul ties. II 30
And in another chapter of the same book he says:
These powers of the mind, viz., of peroeiving and of preferring, are usually
called by another name: and the ordinary
way of speaking, is that the understanding a2~ will are two faculties of the
mind.
Lest, however, he should be misunderstood when he uses
the word 'faoulty', Looke proceeds immediately to warn again~t
an improper use of the term.
30 John Locke, Essa On Human Understanding, G. Rutledge & S.,
London, Bt. II, h. VI,. 2.
31 Ibid., Bt. II, Oh. XXI, 6.
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••• and the ordinary way of speaking, is
that the understanding and will are two
faoulties of the mind; a word proper
enough, if it be used, as all words should
be, so as not to breed any oonfusion in
men's thoughts by being supposed (as I
suspeot it has been) to stand for some
real beings in the soul, that performed
these aotions of understanding and volition. For when we say, the will is the
oommanding and superior faoulty of the
soul; that it is or is not free; that it
determines the inferior faculties;
though these and the like expressions •••
may be understood in a clear and distinct
sense; yet I suspeot, I say, that this
way of speaking of faoulties has misled
many into a confused notion of so many
distinot agents in us, whioh had their
several provinoes and authorities ••• as so
many distinct beings; whioh has been no
small occasion of wrangling, obsourity,
and uDQertainty in questions relating to
them. 32
If many of our modern psyohologists and historians of psyohology, who seem to have a mortal dread of the word 'faoulty',
were to read this passage of Looke written three oenturies ago,
they would not merit the 'dig' administered by Spearman against
those "who wrote more than they read. M33
The passages quoted above from the writings of Looke
should be suffioient to establish him as a proponent of

th~,

faoulties in the genuine Thomistic sense of the word, that is,
as powers of the mind.

Moreover, it should not be necessary

to quote further to show his dislike for the inoorreot usage
32 Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. XXI, 6.
33 Spearman, I, 189.
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of the term 'faoulty'.

But sinoe his mind in this

mat~r

is so

muoh akin to the Thomistio position, and sinoe it oomes from
one who is sometimes presented as an antogonist, we will not
hesitate to quote a still more explioit olarifioation of what
he meant when he spoke of the soul's faoulties.

The argument

in the following quotation runs something like this:

If the

faoulties are distinot beings and as such do the aoting, then
it would be proper to have a separate faculty for every
different type of operation.

But since a faculty is a power,

and a power is the power of something, it is the something, in
this case the soul, that does the acting not the distinct
faoulty.
• •• if it be reasonable to suppose and
talk of faculties as distinct beings
that oan act (as we do when we say,
"The will orders,· and "The will is
free,") it is fit that we ~hould make
a speaking faculty, and a walking faoulty
and a danoing faoulty .•• ; and we may as
properly say that it is the Singing
faculty sings, and the dancing faoulty
dances, as that the will chooses, or the
understanding conceives ••. This way of
talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and
as I guess produced great confusion. For
these being all different powers in the
mind or in the man to do several actions,
he exerts them as he thinks fit: but the
power to do one action i8 not operated on
by the power of doing another action.
For the power of thinking operates not on
the power of chOOSing, nor the power of
chOOSing on the power of thinking ••• I
grant that this or that aotual thought
may be the occasion of volition ••• ; or
the actual 'choice of the mind, the cause
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of actual thinking on this or that thing... .'
But in all these it is not one pqwer that
o~rates on another, but it is the mind
t t operates and exerts these powers; it
is the man that does the aqtion, it is 3ie
a~ent that has power, or is able to do.
( ubl1neat1ons not 1n original)
It is the first part of this statement, we believe, that writers
have referred to in considering Locke an enemy of faculty psyohology.

If taken alone out of its context, suoh an opinion

would be justified; taken, however, in its oontext it provides
an excellent defense for the true faculty concept.

There are

two phrases, however, one in each of the last two quotations,
that require a little attention, as they may be possible souroes
of misunderstanding or error.

In the first of these two quo-

tations, Locke says that we should not suppose faculties 'to
stand for some real beings in the soul."

And in the second

quotation, in words with much the same import, he says in
effect that we should not "talk of faculties as distinct beings
that can act."

Now if he had meant that the faculties were not

"real beings" but existed only in the rational order, or that
they were not beings Rdistinct" from the essence of the soul,
we would, of course, be obliged to consider his poSition to ,be
~

in disagreement with that of St. Thomas.

But it is obvious

from the context that Locke was not at all concerned with the
ultimate metaphysics of these 'powers" of the soul.
satisfied to state that the soul definitely
34 Locke, Bk. II, Oh. XXI, 17, 18, 19.

~

He was

powers or
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faculties, and that these powers were not

self-subsist~~t,

and

were therefore the powers of something else--in this case the
soul.

Accordingly, he was not concerned about the ultimate

nature of these powers, nor how they were related in action
with the substance of which they were the powers.

Therefore,

when he said that the faculties were not "real beings," or
were not "distinct beings that can act," he very obviously
meant that they were not independently existing and independently operating entities,--a point that scholastic philosophers
insist on most strenuously.
In view of Locke's position as here presented, Spearman's
following remark insofar as it refers to Locke seems entirely
unfounded.
The bitterest attacks upon the faculties
go back at least as far as Malebranche,
who saw in them an opportunity for censuring his chronic foes, the Aristotelian
Schoolmen. Locke followed suit by making
them the butt for his keenest satire. 35
Locke could hardly have made the faculties the "butt of his
keenest satire" if he himself advocated a faculty theory.
"His keenest satire" was directed against a misuse of the
'faoulty,' for which he should be justly lauded as having
rendered a great service to, and not an indiotment of, the
faoul ty theory.

35 Spearman, I, 184.

t~,m
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As in the case of Descartes and Spinoza, so in

tha~

of

Leibnitz, it is necessary, in order to understand his attitude
toward faculties, to have some general idea of his philosophy
of mind.
Leibnitz is famous for his philosophy of monads.

According
to that philosophy monads are incorruptible,36 simp1e37 substanoes, the ultimate constituents of oreated being. 38 Eaoh of
these ultimates, though immune to any ohange from an external
agent,39 is, nevertheless, as a result of an internal principle,40 undergoing oontinuous 4l internal change. Moreover, in
each monad there is a particular series of these internal changes,
which series being different in the different monads constitute
the specific nature that differentiates them. 42

So much for the nature of the monad; now about its activitZ.
The monad, as seen above, is by its very nature continuously
undergoing change.

These continuous internal changes Leibnitz
calls nperceptions. n43 When the oontinuous ohange from one

36 Gottfried W. Leibnitz, The ~onadologz, trl. by R. Latta,
Humphrey Milford, Oxford Univ. Pr., 1925, n.4, 6, 218, 219.
37 Ibid., n. 1, 217.
38 Ibid., n. a, 217.
~~~
39 Ibid., nne 7, 11, 219, 223.
40 Ibid., n. 11, 223.
41 Ibid., n. 10, 222.
42 Ibid., n. 12, 223.
43 Ibid., n. 14, 224-225, of. also n. 17, 227-229.
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perception to another takes place, the activity of the tnternal
principle that oauses this change is called "Appetition. H44
All monads have these perceptions and appetitions or desires

.

(appetits), and therefore may be called souls.

.

Nevertheless,

~

he says, it is better to distinguish between those monads which
have bare perceptions only, and those in which perception is
more distinct, Which have feeling, and.whose peroeption is
accompanied by memory.

The former may better be called bare

monads or entelechies, and the latter~.Souls.45

Souls, and

a fortiori bare monads, by their very nature are never without
perception. 46 However, these perceptions can be more or less
distinct and striking, and the degree of this distinctness
constitutes the various degrees of consciousness from sleeping
to waking. 47 Accordingly, all our ideas are within us in germ,
so to speak, and by the prooess of this oonstant internal
ohange they beoome more and more distinot.

That which disting-

uishes our rational souls from those of animals is that through
this continual evolution of internal perception rational souls
can come to the knowledge of necessary and' eternal truths,
whereas an~als cannot arrive at suoh knowledge. 48
44 ~., n. 15, 226.
45 ~., n. 19, 230.
46 Ibid., n. 21, 230-231.
47 Ibid., nne 20-24, 230-231.
48 Ibid., n. 29, 233.
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There is one last aspect of this novel system
must especially note.

whi~

we

Man, as is rather evident, is composed

not only of rational soul but also of body.

But the soul, as

we saw, is incapable of being determined in any way from without.

All its activity is internal.

HOw, then, can the

knowled~

the soul gets through the senses by the agency of the body's
sense organs be explained.

The explanation is rather simple.

God in establishing the universe so ordered all monads that
they would each work in perfect harmony.

Accordingly, when the

bare monads of matter by their own internal change bring about
sensible physical phenomena, the soul by its own internal
changes concomitantly makes the corresponding changes, so that
perceptions arise in the mind corresponding to, but not caused
by, the external phenomena.'9
With this as a general background, we are now in a position
to examine what place can be found in that background for the
doctrine of faculties. Stout claims 50 that Leibnitz ought to
receive as much credit for attacking innate faculties as Locke
has received for attacking innate ideas.

Yet it seems that

Leibnitz does not entirely reject faculties.

On the contrary

his philosophy demands the two principle faculties of Perception

49 Ibid., nne 52, 78, 246-247, 262.
50

G.r. Stout, Analytic Psycbology, SWan Sonnenschein, London,
1896, I, 18.
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and APpetition. 51

It is true his idea of faculty, becdUse of

his own peouliar philosophio system, is different from the
Aristotelian-Thomistic notion, and this latter he does attaok.
Nevertheless, the real objeot of his attack seems to be, as we
shall see, rather a carioature of the faculties than that which
is aotually proposed by St. Thomas.
Leibnitz, of oourse, will have none of Lookets tabula rasa
which receives its ideas through the medium of sensation and
reflexion.

The mind according to Leibnitz is not a blank

something that receives its perceptions from without, but it
contains within itself the germ of all its ideas.

These ideas

contained in germ within the soul come into consciousness
through the oontinuous process of internal ohanges or "perceptions."

But, Leibnitz says, you may object and say that

the "tabula" is not entirely "rasa" but has faculties by means
of which it can contaot the reality without.
You may perhaps reply that this tabula
rasa of the philosophers means that the
soul has by nature and originally only
bare faoulties. But faculties without
some act, in a word the pure powers of
the sohool, are also only fictions, which
nature knows not, and which are obtained
only by the process of abstraotion. For
where in the world will you ever find a
faculty whioh shuts itself up in the
power alone without performing any act?

.

,

51 Leibnitz, n. 48, 244-245, also What Is Idea, New Essays trl.
by Langley, Open Oourt, Ohicago, 1916, 716.
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There is alw~ys a partioular disposition
to action, and to one action rather than
to another. And besides the disposition
there is a tendency to action, of which
tendencies there is always an infinity
in each subject at once; and these tendencies are never Without some effect. 52

.'

This quotation is an excellent epitome of the meaning of
'faculty' in Leibnitz' monadological system.

After first

impugning the faculties of the Schoolmen, he brings out clearly
that he does not consider the powers of the soul to be dependent
on external stimuli for their activity; they are internal
"dispositions" and "tendencies to action" which, moreover, are
always in action for they are "never without some effect."

A

pure potency or power in the strict Aristotelian sense, he says,
cannot exist, for there is no potency or power possible without
its being here and now reduced to act.

These powers are ten-

dencies which are always in the process of aot.

"Real powers

are never simple possibilities," says Leibnitz; "they have
always tendenoy and aotion."53 Wallace explains this position
of Leibnitz with regard to the faoulties very well:
It is out of the variety, the oomplioation,
and relations of these minature or little
peroeptions and appetitions that the oonspiouous phenomena of consciousness are to
be explained, and not by suppoaing them due
to one or the other faculties. o4
52 Leibnitz, trl. Langley, Bk. II, Oh. I, n. 2.
53 ~., Bk. II, Oh. I, n. 10.
54 Wallaoe, 58-59.
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The powers of the soul, then, in Leibnitz'

philoso~hy

are

internal dynamic evolutionary forces whicb produce conscious
pbenomena wbolly within tbe mind.

Henoe the soholastio conoept

of a power as being only in part immanently aotive and in part
passive, that is, requiring some determination from external
phenomena, will not fit with his system.

Aooordingly, to the

scholastio diotum, "Nibil est in intellectu quod non prius
fueri t in sensu," Leibnit z logioally adds, "Nisi ipse
intellectus. If 55
In view of his system, then, it is quite intelligible why
Leibnitz should oonsider "faoulties without some act, in a word
the pure powers of the school .•. only fictions, which nature
knows not, and which are obtained only by the prooess of
abstraction."

If they were

~

than fiotions,

a!!

system

would be a fiotion; if nature would oondesoend to "know them,"
his system would have to be one "wbicb nature knows not."
Moreover, Leibnitz misses tbe mark rather badly wben he
says that the faoulties are "obtained only by the process of
abstraction."

There is a great deal of difference between tbe

process of abstraction and the process of deduotion.

The

prooess of abstraotion is that employed in the formation of

55 Leibnitz, trl. Langley, Bk. II, Oh. I, n. 2.
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universal concepts, and the faculties of St. Thomas
are not universal concepts.

de~nitely

The process of deduction is that

used in arriving at the nature of a cause by examining the
nature of the effect.

By examining the manifold of conscious-

ness, one deduces the necessity of a principle for such activity
and thus arrives at the necessity of the soul as the ultimate
principle, and of the faculties as the proximate principles of
the phenomena of consciousness.
It is true, however, that the faculties, considered from
the viewpoint of Leibnitz' own philosophy, could perhaps be
considered mere "abstractions," for in his system the 'faculty"
(entelechy) is never without some "act" (perception).

Hence

the idea of a "faculty" alone without some "act" would be a
sort of abstraction.

In his strictures against the faculties,

therefore, Leibnitz, by considering them merely abstractions.
makes clear that he,as the Nominalists,does not recognize the
validity of the realism of the Schools.

The Thomistic Schoolmen

would, therefore, reject his criticism, as it rejects that of
any nominalistic position wbich denies a parte rei foundations
j..

;~

for generalizations arrived at by a process of reasoning.
Leibnitz, then, out of loyalty to bis system was constrained to disagree with that which did not fit into it.

Even

if he had rightly understood (which is possible) the scholastic
doctrine of the faculties, out of sheer consistency he would
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have been forced to disagree With it.

Yet it seems

ver~

likely,

as we shall show presently, that he did not understand the
scholastic position, and, acoordingly, that when he attacked
the faculties of the Schools, he attacked shadows; that he
attacked not the scholastic doctrine but its caricature.
In the prooess of discussing the proposition whether a
purely material thing thinks or not, he says:
To .speak in an entirely simple manner of
giving or according powers is to return
to the naked faoulties of the Scboolmen
and to imagine minute self-subsisting
entities which may go in and out like
pigeons from a pigeon bouse. It is
making substances of them Without being
aware of it. o6
Oertainly one who calls the faculties of tbe Schoolmen "minute
self-subsisting entities which may go in and out like pigeons
from a pigeon house," definitely does not understand their
doctrine at all.

For it is of the very essence of the School-

men's "naked faculties" that they are not self-subsisting, and
that they cannot "go in and out like pigeons."

The scholastio

doctrine is emphatiC on this point, that the faculties are
independent either in nature ~ in operation.

B2i

Moreover, they

were never in any sense considered to be substances, but only
accidents.
It seems likely that such a distortion of the faculties was
56

~.,

Sk. IV, Oh. III, n. 6.

48

.'

not malicious, but Was due partially at least to a misunderstanding of what the Schoolmen, especially the Thomistic
Schoolmen, really held.

Leibnitz seemed at least to understand

that notion of faculty which the Schoolmen actually held, but
erroneously attributed to them a distortion of that theory.
For in commenting on Lockets warning that by loose speeoh one
can distort the true nature of the faoulties, Leibnitz remarks
that he does not care to deoide the problem whether or not the
faculties are real and distinct entities; and quite correctly
adds that if they are, they certainly could not be considered
as real agents, for it is not the faculties that act but the
substance, by means of the faculties:
The question has exercised the scholastics
a long time whether there is a real distinction between the soul and its faculties, and
whether one faoulty is really distinct from
another ••. The Realists said yes, and the
Nominalists, no, and the same question has
been agitated as to the reality of many
other abstract entities, which should meet
the same fate. But I do not think we need
here decide this question and plunge into
these difficulties ••• However, if they
were real and distinct entities, they can
pass for real agents only in extravagant
speech. It is not the faculties or
qualities which act, but substances by
means of the faculties. 57

"

If we exoept the remark about "abstract entities," the propriety
of Which terminology we discussed above, there is very little
exception that can be taken to such a statement.
57 Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. XXI, n. 6.
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evidence that Leibnitz both knew something of the probLem and
something of the form the solution must take.

Accordingly,

the mistake he made in attacking the Schoolmen seems to be not
so much a mistake of theory as a mistake of

!!£i. He understood

the theory sufficiently well, but he falsely accused the
Scholastics of holding as their doctrine of the faculties such
distortions as "self-subsisting entities which go in and out
like pigeons from a pigeon house."

To accuse the Schools of

propounding such a doctrine is certainly to be unaoquainted
with, and, oonsequently, to misrepresent the faots.
With the section on Leibnitz we conclude this ohapter on
the early modern philosophers.

Suffice it to say, in conolud-

ing this chapter, that we have already noted some of the principle objeotions against the faculties: that they are not
realities, but merely names oonvenient for classifying mental
phenomena; that they are self-subsisting beings; that they are
beings independent or autonomous in their aotivity; that they
are fiotions of the mind.

That these objeotions cannot justly

be alleged against the Thomistic faculties is a faot, the proof
of which has been made sufficiently obvious, we hope, as not
to require repetition here.

.'
OHAPTER

IV

FAOULTY OONOEPT FROM WOLFF TO HERBART

'Faculty Psychology" received an entirely new impetus in
the philosophy of Ohristian Wolff, Emmanuel Kant, and later by
Gall and his phrenology.

Following almost immediately upon

this new impetus, came a theory diametrically opposed to that
of the"so-called" faculties of the mind.

This new theory was

that of the Associationists, of which group Johann Herbart was
the leader.

It will be the purpose of this chapter to analyze

these two counter positions and to evaluate each according to
the Thomistic position.
Wolff's findings, it seems,

wer~

not new and in some

respects they recapitulated the opinions of the earlier faculty
psychologists.

Perhaps more than anyone else, however, Wolff

is responsible for calling explicit attention to a new trend
that had been shOWing itself in the field of psychology.
chologists had been becoming more and more empirically
and less concerned with the metaphysics of psychology.

Psy-

minde~

Recog-

nizing this growing distinction, Wolff divided the field into
Rational and Empirical Psychology.

The gap between these two

diSCiplines became wider and wider in the ensuing years, so
50
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that today the greater portion of psyohologioal endeavo; is no
longer philosophic but soientific.

We are here calling

explicit attention to this important historic fact, for as we
shall later see, this pronounced change of approach to the
field of psychology has been the source of many attacks on the
faculty theory.
Kant, a disciple of Wolff who was destined to outshine by
far his master, occupies a very important position in the
history of "faculty psychology."

So important is the place he

occupies, that it is our reasoned opinion that later condemnations of the faculty theory are directed largely, though, perhaps, in many cases unconsciously, against his doctrine.
Herbart, for example, whose work was considered at one time to
be so devastating, that it was said he not only "killed" the
faculties, but "cremated" them and scattered their ashes,
mentions as the object of his attack not the faculties of the
Schoolmen, but those of Wolff and Kant.l

Our

present concern,

then, will be to inquire, with a degree of thoroughness proportionate to its importance, into the psychology of Kant, and
to determine as clearly as possible his theory of the faculties.
When we read through the works of some of the earlier
modern philosophers, we find with difficulty any use of the
1 Johann F. Herbart, A Text-Book in PS~ChOlOgf' trl. by Kargaret
K. Smith, Appleton, New York, 1891,
(note.
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term "faoulty."

Suoh is oertainly not the oase with ragard to

the works of Kant.

Mention of the various faoulties is very

frequent in his pages.

In order to understand them properly,

bowever, it will be neoessary to see them in their setting.

In

other words it will be necessary to get a general idea of
Kant's theory of knowledge.
All knowledge, says Kant, has its souroe in sense impressions.

The manifold of sense impressions beoome intuitions

only when invested with the a priori forms of time and space.
Sense intuition, then, is the manifold of sensation organized
or synthesized by the forms of time and space. 2
However, the manifold of sense impressions synthesized by
the forms of time and space into sense intuitions are not as
yet intellectual knowledge.

They must first pass into the

a priori forms of the cognoscitive faoulties, and must be

s~

thesized by the oategories of the understanding into conscious
intelleotual knowledge, muoh in the same way that sense impressions are synthesized into intuitions by being invested
with the forms of time and spaoe.

Oonsoious knowledge,

is formed, oonstituted, synthesized by the oategories.

th~~,

The

2 "Space and time are the pure forms of our intuition, while
sensation forms its matter. Whatever our sensation may be,
these forms are necessarily inherent in it, while sensations
themselves may be of the most different character."
Immanuel Kant, Oritique of Pure Reason, trl. by Max Muller,
Maomillan, Bew York, 1927, 34=35.

53

categories are the universal, necessary, a priori formL.. of
thought.

They oonstitute the intelleotual element of knowledge.

They reoeive the sense intuitions through the mediation of the
blind faoulty of imagination,3 and invest them With one of the
twelve universal a priori forms oalled categories.

All this

process of tinvestiture' is anterior to oonsoiousness.

Sense

intuitions become oonsoious knowledge only after having been
invested with the forms of the categories.

Such is the process

involved in the syntheSiS of thought.'
The evolution of thought, then, begins with the collection
of sense phenomena into the manifold of sense impressions,
which, sifted into and unified by the a priori forms of time
space, constitute sense intuitions.

These intuitions in turn

are further unified by the imaginationS and sifted into the

3 Ibid., 64, also 101-102.
4 'The spontaneity of our thought requires that what is manifold
in the pure intuition should first be in a certain way examined, received, and connected, o:>y the oategories] in order
to produce (underlining mincU a knowledge of it. This act I
call Synthesis. • •• Knowledge is first produced by the s~
thesis of what is manifold ••• We shall see hereafter that
synthesiS in general is the mere result of what I call the
faculty of imagination ••• But to reduce this syntheSiS to
concepts is a function that belongs to the understanding
(jri th its categories], and by Which the understanding
supplies us for the first time with knowledge properly so
called." Ibid., 64-65.
5 Ibid., 64-65, also 101-102.
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categories, whioh are the constitutive prinoiples of conscious
knowledge. 6
However, the unity of constituted knowledge is not enough.
There must be a further unifying of the acts of knowledge into
the forms of reasoning or ratiocination.

Man is not only a

judging animal; he is also a reasoning, syllogizing, rationalizing animal.

Hence the knowledge already constituted by the

oategories is now regulated by the three transoendental forms
a priori of the faculty of reason called Ideas. 7
This unifying of the thought material of the categories by
the a priori regulative8 forms, oalled Ideas, constitutes the
final step used by the mind in the synthesis and unification of
its produot--thought.

Suoh a process reminds us strongly of

the functioning of a factory where

t~e

raw materials are poured

in at one end, and the finished product drops out at the other.
6 "The first that must be given us a priori for the sake of knowledge of all objects, is the manifold in pure intuition. The
second is the synthesis of the manifold by means of imagination. But this does not yet produoe true knowledge. The oonoepts [categorie~ which impart unity to this pure synthesis
and oonsist entirely in the representation of this necess~~y
synthetioal unity, add the third oontribution towards the'
knowledge of an object, and rest on the understanding."
Ibid., 65.
7 "Ideas, however, are still further removed from objective
reality than the categories, ••• They oontain a oertain
completeness unattainable by any possible empirical knowledge,
and reason aims in them at a systematical unity only, ••• "
Ibid., 459.
8 Kant, Oritique of Aesthetic Judgment, trl. by J.O. Meredith,
Olarendon, Oxford, 1911, Preface to First Edition, 3.
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We have traoed in brief the prooess of oognosoitiv,
operation.

Now we must investigate the individual factors that

are responsible for this process.

In other words we must deter-

mine the number, classification, nature, and function of Kant's
faculties of the soul.
first we shall consider the number and classifioation of
the faculties.
for all the faoulties of the soul, or
oapacities, are reducible to three, whioh
do not admit of any further deviation from
a common ground: the faculty of knoWledge,
the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and
the faoUlty of desire. 9
The faoulty of knowledge, however, is not single.

It i.

composed of the cognoscitive faculties of understanding, judgment, and reason.

Speaking of his Critique of Pure Reason,

Kant remarks:
Hence it makes our cognoscitiv8 faoulties
its sole concern, to the exclusion of the
feeling of pleasure or displeasure and the
faoulty of desire; and among the oognoscitive
faoulties it confines its attention to
understanding and its a priori prinoiples, 10
to the exclusion of judgment and reason, •••
Within the faculty of understanding, moreover, we have'the
twelve a priori constitutive forms or concepts oalled
categories. l1 Within the faculty of reason are found the three
9 ~., Introduction, 15-16.
10 ~., Preface to first Edition, 3.
11 Kant, (Muller), 66.
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regulative prinoiples oalled Ideas. Besides these,
erates the faoulty of lmagination. 12

Ka~~

enum-

The faoulties thus far explicitly enumerated have been on
the intellectual level.

On the sense level there is the

"faoulty of reoeiving representations ••• called sensibility.H13
This faculty of sensibility in turn contains the "two pure
forms of sensuous intuition, namely, Spaoe and Time."14
With all this evidenoe of a diversity of faoulties, we
oertainly oan consider Kant's psyohology a "faoulty psyohology."
OUr next problem after having enumerated the various
faoulties (and this enumeration professes to be substantially
but not absolutely oomplete) is to investigate the nature of
the faoulties and their a priori forms.
Are the faculties and their forms inherent qualities of
the soul, by reason of which the soul can act?

Are they the

powers the soul possesses, by reason of which it is capable of
produoing its own aots?

Or are they conceived of as independent

and autonomous parts of the soul, or as oontainers, so to
into whioh phenomenal content is poured, so as to take the
shape or form of sensation or thought as the oase may be.
12 Ibid., 64-85, also 101-102.
13 Ibid., 15.
14 Ibid., 17.

sp~ak,
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These latter two conceptions of the faculties seem to oome
closest to the doctrine of Kant.
Turner, for example, speaks of the categories as "empty
forms of intellectual knowledge, all the oontents of intelleotua.
knowledge being derived from experience."15 Again, "the categories without representative or other empirical content are
empty.B16

Henderson makes the following remarks concerning

Kantian faoulties:
Aocording to the notion of the faculties,
the sorts of consciousness are the results
of the manipulation by these inner powera
of the material given by the senees •••
They merely arrange the materials of sense
in a different manner; manufacture it, as
it were, into new forma. l ?
The views thus expressed are easily substantiated by quotations from the works of Kant himself.

Speaking of empirioal

sense intuitions, he says: DSpaoe and time are pure forms of
our intuition while sensation forms its matter. nlS Again in
his discussion of the categories we find the following statement:
Transcendental logic, on the contrary, has
before it the manifold contents of sensibility a priori, supplied by transcendental
15 Turner, History of PhilosophY, Ginn, New York, 1929, 534.
16 ~., 535.
17 I.N. Henderson, A Text-Book in the Principles of Education,
Kacmillan, New York, 1924, 290.
lS Kant (Muller), 34.
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aesthetic as the material for the ooncepts
[oategorieaI of the pure understanding,
without whioh those oonoepts would be without any oontents, therefore entirely empty. 19

Hote especially the words, "without which (manifold oontents of
sensibility a priori) those concepts (oategories) would be without any oontents, therefore entirely empty. ,.

Dr. Paul Oarus, in an essay on Kant's philosophy oompares
Kant's faoulties and forms to mental pigeon-holes:
The difference between the oabinet with
pigeon-holes and the human mind is this,
that the former is artifioial, the latter
natural. The human mind with its rationality has been developed aooording to
meohanical law and the olassifioation of
sense impressions is done by it as automatioally as the distribution of the different loaters in a type distributing
maohine. a
If the faoulties with their forms are, aooording to their
nature, distinot oompartment-like beings, one might expect that
in their operation they should be equally distinot, and therefore, in their funotions independent of eaoh other or autonomous.
And suoh is precisely what Kant held: prinoiples autonomous and
independent in their operations.

Speaking of the faoulties of

understanding and of reason, he says:
Both faoulties, therefore, besides their
applioation in point of logioal form to
prinoiples of Whatever origin, have, in
19 ~., 63-64.
20 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena, edit. in English by P. Oarus,
Open Oourt, Ohioago, 1933, 220.
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addition, their own peouliar jurisdiotion
.'
in the matter of their oontent, and so,
there being no further a priori jurisdiotion
above them, the division of Philosophy i~to
theoretioal and praotioal is justified. a1
(Sublineations not in original)
Eaoh of these two faoulties then have "their own peouliar jurisdiotion" and, moreover, have "no further jurisdiotion above
them."

In another plaoe Kant speaks of the higher faoulties

"as faoulties oontaining an autonomy.uaa

Olearly, this is a

far ory from the Thomistio dootrine of the faoulties, aooording
to whioh the faoulties are by essenoe dependent on the soul,
whioh alone is !a! effioient prinoiple.
As a result of this investigation of the nature and
funotion of the Kantian faoulties, we have found that they are
independent in existenoe and autonomous in operation.

Suoh a

oonolusion would naturally give rise·to the question, "Whenoe
the unity of oonsoiousness that we aotually experienoe?"

"How

does Kant aohieve unity in the mind?"
Kant does aohieve a unity in the mind, but it is the unity
of integral parts in a oomposite whole, and not the substantial
unity of the soul aooording to the Thomistio dootrine.

Meredith

in an essay on the Oritique of Judgment speaks of the "mind as a
al Kant (Meredith), Introduotion, 15.
22 Ibid., Introduction, 38.
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system with various speoial faoulties, all oombining harmoniously in a teleologioal unity."

Then quoting Kant, he says:

••• reason is, in regard to the principles
of cognition, a perfeotll distinct,
independent unitz, in Which, as in an
organized body, every member exists for
the sake of the others, and all for the
sake of each, so that no prinoiple can
be viewed, with safety, in one relationship, unless it is, at the same time,
viewed in re~ttion to the total use of
pure reason.
{Sublineation not in original)
At this point it is proper to give ear to a reasonable
objection that may be raised against the form that this brief
Kantian analysis has taken.

To speak of Kantian faculties as

moulds or forms into whioh thought is "sifted" or 'poured,"
it may be objected, is graphic but is hardly representative of
Kant's real meaning.

To speak of the faculties as we have done

is to oonsider them as noumena, whereas Kant never reaohes the
noumena; his critique remains wholly in the phenomena.

One

cannot properly speak of Kantian faculties as aotually existing
as this present analysis would lead one to assume.

For Kant

the soul and its faoulties were no more actually existent than
the external world of sense.

The a priori forms are

rather'~

simple ways or forms acoording to which the mind by its very
nature must think, much as Scholastic philosophers would say
23 Emanuel Kant, Oritique of pure Reason, trl. by J.M.D. Meiklejohn, Bell & Sons, 1930, London, Preface to Second Edition,
xxxii, cf. Kant (Meredith) pg xix.
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that whenever our minds think, they always must think according
to, or be regulated by, first principles.
Nevertheless, in spite of this objection, it seems safe to
state that Kant's manner of speaking has left his writings open
to the interpretation here given, and has made it possible for
subsequent psychologists to conoeive of the notion of "faculty"
as a sort of "mould" or "form," or even "pigeon-hole," and for
that very reason, has made it possible for them to reject it.
Oonsequently, we are now in something of a position to
form a rather important conclusion with regard to the Kantian
faculty psychology.

Subsequent to Kant author after author has

used all sorts of abusive language against the faculties.

"The

mind was not unlike a series of pigeon-holes, or heremetically
sealed compartments."24 " ••• composi~e of abstract energies.· 25
" ••• bundle of detached powers, somehow standing side by
side ••• "26

HThe faculty theory bids us search for the energy

of the mind •.• in the manipulating power of certain abstraot
agencies, ••• H27

"The mind is regarded as a machine of which the

different faculties are parts."28

" ••• the mind is a storag~

24 L.A. Averill, Elements of Educational Psychology, HoughtonMifflin, New York, 1924, 351.
25 Ibid., 351.
26 James Sully, Outlines of Psyohology, Appleton, New York, 1885,
26.
27 Henderson, 285.
28 E.L. Thorndike, The Principles of Teaching, Seiler, New York,
1921. 236.
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battery whioh oan be loaded with will power or intelleoc or
jUdgment ••• R29 • ••• bank to be drawn on at leiBure. H30 • •.• fabulous entities whioh worked out the destinies of the individual. H31 True, most of these aoousations oome from educational
psyohologists, who are oonfronted with the problem of training
the mind, a problem slightly different from that of the pure
psyohologist.

Nevertheless, if there i8 any basis for their

aoousations in the purely psyohologioal doctrine of the faoulties, it oertainly would not be in the faculty psychology of
St. Thomas.

Justifioations for such aoousations aooording to

our opinion oould be found only in one or both of two plaoes;
that is, either in the loose and oareless terminology of an
orthodox Thomistic faoulty psyohologist, or in the oarioatures
of orthodox faoulty psyohology suoh as that suggested in the
philosophy of Xant.

As we saw, his faoulties and a priori

forms may be considered as "oompartments," "detaohed powers,"
integral "parts," forms to be filled, etc.

It i8 just such

oonoepts that have given the handle to many of our modern psyohologists, eduoational or otherwise, for muoh of the vituperation or dignified disdain meted out to "faoulty psychology.',

29 Ibid., 237.
30

~.,

237.

31 S.S. Oolvin, The Learning Process, Maomillan, New York, 1922,
212.
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The history of the faoulty theory reaohes an

impor~ant

phase in the philosophy of Johann Freidrioh Herbart, Kant's
suooessor at Koenigsburg.

Herbart's utter rejeot10n of faoul-

ties and faoulty psyohology was the first great impetus towards
the modern "overthrow" of the faculty theory.

The transition

from Kantian Idealism to the Assooiationism of Herbart lies in
the similarity with whioh the oontent or raW material of consoiousness in both rival systems somehow slips in lunawares'.
For Kant this unoonsoious oontent is rendered conscious through
the nmanipulation" of the a priori forms.

Herbart will have

none of this inner manipulation of faoulties.

For him the un-

apprehended content material is lifted into the realm of consciousness by "the foroe of other kindred ideas that are already
in this realm. n32

New ideas are lifted into consoiousness be-

oause of their relation with old ones.
It may possibly be legitimate to oonsider suoh a ohange in
dootrine a transition, but it would seem more acourate to oall
it a oleavage, a hiatus, or a complete break; for a fathomless
philosophioal abyss separates the two positions.
clung to the notion of a soul.

For Herbart the soul was at'best

meaningless and virtually non-existent.
The Simple nature of the soul is totally
unknown and will forever remain so. It
is as little an objeot 0i3speoulative as
of empirioal psyohology.
32 Henderson, 290-291.
33 Herbart. 120.

Kant still
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If the mind, then, is utterly superfluous insofar as the
production of ideas is concerned, it is not hard to conceive
what place is reserved for the mind's faculties.

Bode rightly

saw the immediate illation when he remarked, "The repudiation
of the substantive mind involves, as its implication, abandonment of the belief in faculty psychology and formal

discipline.~

However, it is not necessary to rely merely on an illation to
arrive at Herbart's position on faoulties.

He is quite explicit

in their condemnation.
The soul has no innate natural talents nor
faoulties whatever, either for the purpose
of receiving or for the purpose of produoing. It is, therefore, no tabula rasa in
the sense that impressions foreign to itself may be made upon it; moreover, in the
sense indioated by Leibnitz, it is not a
substance which includes in itself original
activity. It bas originally neither ooncepts, nor feelings, nor desires. It knows
nothing of itself, and nothing of other
things; also in it lie no forms of perception and thought, no laws of willing and
action, and not i~en a remote predisposition
to any of these.
We are not surprised then when we find that Herbart is universally held up as an implaoable enemy of "Faculty psychology."
Author after author makes the remark that with Herbart, faculty
psychology met with a deadly foe.

34 B.H. Bode, Oonf1icting Psychologies of Learning, Heath,
Ohicago, 1929, 88.
~5

Herbart, 120.
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It is not our purpose here to enter upon a refutation of
Associationism.

It is sufficient to note that the nature of

the doctrine essentially excludes anything like faculties of
the soul.

Moreover, it is clear, that in order to establish

his position, Herbart was forced to wage war on the doctrine
of faculties.

Yet to get a clear picture of this situation it

is essential to note against whose doctrine of faculties his
guns were leveled.

Was it against the faculties of St. Thomas?

Herbart himself tells us against whom his artillery was
directed.
It may be briefly stated here, but not shown
in detail, that in modern times psyohology
has rather gone backWard than forward. In
regard to this science, Locke and Leibnitz
were both upon a better path than that along
which we have been led by Wolff and Kant.
The two latter advooate in a peculiar manner
the discrimination of mental faculties, and
for this reason must be olassed together,
however much they differ from each other in
other respeots. Wolff had in mind the
logical task of classifying mental phenomena,
without troubling himself more closely with
their inner origination, and for this reason
he is unequaled in the thOughtlessness with
which he covers up the greatest difficulties
with mere verbal definitions. Kant makes use
of the hypothetical mental faculties to present his investigation clearly according to
form, that he might accompany human knowledge
in its progress from the senses to the understanding and the reason, and it is not easy
to rid his writings of this hryothesis. 36
(Sublineations not in original

36 Berbart, 7, (Note).

.,
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Oertainly no one would hold up Wolff and much 1es&,Kant as
authors of the best expression of Thomistic faculty psychology.
As a matter of fact, it would be hard for Herbart to rival the
invective that a Thomistic faculty psychologist would level at
Kantian faculties.

Therefore since the criticism of Herbart

is not primarily directed against the theory as propounded by
St. Thomas, a refutation of his criticism here would seem to be
superfluous.

However, for sake of completeness, and since any

attack on faculties reductive1y affects the Thomistic theory,
we will add Professor Spearman's devastating comment on the
Associationism of Herbart.
Herewith we reach the very antithesis of the
doctrine of faculties; every different mental
process now stands for itself; we pass from
the Do1igarchic" doctrine of a few reigning
prinCiples to the "anarchylf of a disordered
multitude of particular cases ••• Drop this
[some sort of generalization of mental activity either by 'faculties', or "substantially
the same doctrine under other names"] and the
scope of all knowledge is reduced to that of
particular cases. Generalities disappear;
and therewith, soience. The whole of the
psychology fabricated after this fashion
comes olattering down like a house built up
of cards. 37
At about the time Herbart was writing his Lebrbuch zurPsyohologie (1816), which contained his utter rejection of the
faoulties, a novel soheme of faoulty psyohology was being

de-

vised by Gall and his pupil Spurzheim in their work Anatomie et
37 O. Spearman, Psyoho1ogy Down the Ages, Maomillan, London, 19
I, 191-192.
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Physiologie du Systeme
" Nerveux (1810).

A good

desoript1~n

of

this bizarre system of faoulties is given us by Bode.
The dootrine of phrenology is of interest
here beoause it represents a oombination
of faoulty psyohology and physiology .•. The
suggestion advanoed by the phrenologists was
that the different faoulties of the mind had
their "seat" in oertain speoifio parts of the
brain, and that if a given trait or faoulty
was highly developed, this faot would show
itself in the prominenoes or the "bumps" of
the skull •.• In order to make this soheme
work, the whole set of faoulties was largely
made over. Instead of determining the
faoulties of the mind by such abstraot
qualities as reasoning, imagining, peroeiving, eto., the phrenologists studied
individuals for the purpose of noting outstanding traits of behavior, such as
amativeness, pugnaoity, oonsoientiousness,
and the like. These traits were olassed as
faoulties, and the attempt was made to
oorrelate th!W With the oonfigurations of
the skull •••
Although almost entirely physiologioal, the dootrine was,
nevertheless, oonsidered to be a variant of "faoulty psyohology."

Sinoe later it degenerated into a speoies of parlor

game amusement, it helped to plunge Faoulty Psyohology deeper
into the disrepute into whioh it had fallen.

Oonsequently when

we find an author oalling into question the existenoe of
faoulties because there "is no such thing as a oenter for
memory" sinoe "the faots indioate that the various aots of
remembering involve all sorts of 'oenters ' ,"39 we oome to see
38 Bode, 51-52.

39 Ibid., 52.

-
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more clearly how such an attack on the "faculties" can uve no
reference whatever to the metaphysical faculties of St. Thomas.
There is an important fact, which though obvious, is of
sufficient importance to deserve explicit attention here;
namely, that the term "Faculty Psychology" is anything but univocal.

Anyone who should, in studying Gall's or Kant's

"tectonic" faculties, feel that he has reached a full understanding of "faculty psychology," would be similar to the student of political science who felt that he was fully conversant
with the theory of Democracy after making an intense study of
'democraoy' as found in the U.S.S.R.

The variants of "faculty

psychology" are so divergent as hardly to deserve the same
generio term.

Oonsequently, an attack against one kind of

faculty psychology could hardly be oonsidered as justified
against any or every other variation.

Surely an attaok against

the physiologioal theory of phrenology would be most unjustly
urged against the metaphysioal theory of Thomistio faoulty
psyohology.

.'
OHAPTER

V

LATER ORITIOISMS
The vast amount of psychological literature that has been
published since the beginning of the nineteenth century has
contained a large number of varied criticisms of the faculties
and faculty psychology.

And yet strangely enough many of the

avowed enemies of the faculties have given surprising evidenoe
of inoonsistenoy, and have athemselves very often introduoed
what are essentially faoulties ••• although usually other terms
are employed, such as 'abilities', 'oapaoities', 'instinots',
and 'temperaments· ••• al Nevertheless the faot remains that the
attacks have been many and varied.

Throughout them all, how-

ever, there runs a remarkable similarity, and despite the
acoidental differences resulting from the varied approaohes and
oontexts in whioh the attacks have been made, nearly all oan be
reduoed to three or four types or forms.
There are, first of all, those who oritioize the

faoul~~es

as independent agents distinct in being, and autonomous in
operation.

The second large division of objectors centers its

1 O. Spearman, Psychologl Down the Ages, Maomillan, London,
1937, I, 185-186.
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attaok on this point, that whereas the faculties are poftulated
in order to serve as an explanation of mental phenomena, they
offer, as a matter of fact, no explanation whatever.

At best,

so it is claimed, they are but helpful concepts for classifying
the varying phenomena of conSCiousness, which phenomena, even
after such classification, remains wholly unexplained.
The third score brought against the faculties is that they
destroy the unity of the mind.

This is a serious objeotion and

one that deserves a careful answer.

The fourth and last major

type of objection is that the classification of mental phenomena
under the head of faculties has been a stumbling block in the
way of progress in psychology.

For instead of stimulating

further investigation into the process of conscious aotivity,
it has, by assigning each process to the activity of a special
faculty, closed the door with a certain air of finality to any
further research.

For those who understand something of the

Thomistic concept of faculty, this seems to be the only objection that carries any weight at all.

And yet it is purely an

extrinsic argument, not in the least affecting the validity of
the theory.

However, even here a careful distinotion will

clear away muOh of the difficulty for an unprejudioed thinker.
OBJEOTION I

FAOULTIES OONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT AGENTS.

As it will be reoalled, Leibnitz berated the faoulties for
being "minute self-subsisting entities which may go in and out
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like pigeons from a pigeon house."

Sully olaims that

!~oulty

psyohology "bad led to the false supposit1on that mental aot1vity, instead of be1ng one and the same throughout its manifold
phases is a juxtaposition of totally distinot aotivities answering to a bundle of detaohed powers, somehow standing side by
side, and exerting no influence on one another. uS

Wundt, one of

the most prominent of the modern psyohologists, has a similar
ax to grind.
It is in the dootrine of feeling and will
more than anywhere else that psyohology
still wears the pattern of the old faoulty
theory. And so it has usually taken a
radioally false view of these intimately
oonneoted prooesses, regarding eaoh
oonstituent as an independently existing
whole, which might incidentally, but need
not necessarily, exert an influence upon
the constituents of the other ••• We must
pronounoe this theory a purely imaginary
oonstruotion from beginning to end. 3
Again there are authors making remarks like these:

"the

mind is regarded as a machine of whioh the different faoulties
are parts";4 "The mind was not unlike a series of pigeon-holes,
or heremetioally sealed oompartments";5 " ••• fabulous entities
2 James Sully, Outlines of Psyohology, Appleton, New York, ~885,
26.
3 W. Wundt, Human and Animal Behavior, pp. 224 sqq., referred to
in The Psyohology of Intelligenoe and Will, by H.G. Wyatt,
Harcourt, New York, 1931, 201-202.
4 E.L. Thorndike, The Principles of Teaching, Seiler, New York,
1921, 236.
5 L.A. Averill, Elements of Eduoational Psychology, Houghton
Mifflin, New York, 1924, 351.
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which worked out the destinies of the individual." 6

.'

How it may be asked: What possible justification can be
found for accusations of such a nature?

Surely anyone who is

in the least acquainted with the Thomistic concept of faculty
will see that they are manifestly unjust.
nearly so unjust as they seem.

And yet they are not

It must be remembered that the

term nfaculty" and "faculty psychology" have been made to apply
as well to Kantian faculties and other concepts of faculties as
to those of the Schoolmen.

How Kantian faculties, as has been

seen, take on the appearance of being just what these aocusations accuse them of being.

They appear to be independent,

autonomous oompartments of the soul that manipulate the content
presented by sensation; and manufacture, so to speak, the
finished thought processes.

Ho one oan condemn a critio too

severely for accusing a thing for being what it appears to be.
Another partial justification for such accusations is the
unguarded use of words by the very ones who profess to uphold
the true concept of faculty.

Thus we find a former President

of Saint Louis University, The Reverend A.J. Burrowes, S.J.,, in
"

a monograph entitled, "Why Study Latin and Greek" making the
following statement: "the human mind is a complicated bit of
mechanism, requiring the highest skill of the educator to adjust
6 S.S. Oolvin, The Learning Prooess, Macmillan, New York, 1922,
212.
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its parts. a7

Obviously he is speaking metaphorically .•,Never-

theless, although not a professional psychologist, yet as a
man "long prominent in Jesuit educational circles" he should be
eXpected by reason of his prestige to be scientific enough in
his phraseology as not to use the sort of language, Which in
the words of Locke, has "produced great confusion."
The last explanation for the type of aocusations at present under consideration, lies in an imperfect understanding of
the doctrine of St. Thomas himself.

To be sure, St. Thomas does

claim for the various faculties, real and distinot existence.
Hence they are real and distinct entities.

But to say that a

being is real and distinct is not at all the equivalent of saying that it is a being independent in existence and operation.
• Substances' and 'aocidents' are both real existent beings, but
a 'substance' in its own order is an'independentll existing
being, whereas the 'acoident' is not.

Now the faculties, acoord-

ing to the position of St. Thomas, are 'accidents', real beings,
to be sure,and distinct from the sUbstanoe which is the soul,
but bl no means independent of the soul either in their existence or in their operation.

In like manner, the faculties ae-

mand for their operation the activity of the soul.

They are,

7 A.J. Burrowes, S.J., Why Study Latin and Greek, Milwaukee,
1901, 5-6, found in YcGucken, The Jesuits and Education,
Bruce, Milwaukee, 1932, 162.
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as it were, channels or instrumental causes for the
the soul.

ac~vity

of

So completely are they dependent on the activity of

the soul for their operation, that if and when that activity
ceases, the operation of the faoulties neoessarily ceases.

-It

is the soul that acts through or by means of the faculties.
SOiendum, quod potentia nihil aliud est
quam principium operationis alicujus,
sive sit actio sive passio; non quidem
principium quod est subjeotum agens aut
patiens;sed id quo agens agit, aut
patiens p~~itur; sicut ars aedifioativa
est potentia in aedificatore, qui per eam
aedificat. 8
Such a conoept of faoulty as here outlined is certainly far
removed from "minute self-subsisting entities whioh go in and
out like pigeons from a pigeon house."

OBJEOTION II

FAOULTIES ARE HELPFUL FOR OLASSIFYING THE
PHENOMENA OF OONSOIOUSNESS, BUT OFFER NO
EXPLANATION OF IT.

This, perhaps, bas been the most popular of all objeotions
offered by psychologists opposed to faculty psyohology.

The

objeotion, variously worded by the different authors, comes to
this: the faculties are not realities but

men~al oonstructs~~

useful perhaps for the purpose of olassifying conscious aots,
but unfortunately personified or hypostatized, and wrongly presented as an explanation of the varied acts of consciousness.
8 St. Thomas Aquinas, QuAe§tiones Disputatae et

~uaestiones

Duadecim Quodlibetales, arietti, faurini-Romae, 1931,
Vol. II. Art. XII. De Anima.
'
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The following excerpt from Dessoir is a rather clear expression
of this position:

It may indeed be of advantage, for purposes of
exposition, to bring similar phenomena under
a generic concept, but such a concept must not
be inflated to a mythological force or entity.
Strictly speaking, each faaUity means simply
a repetition of the faot whose nature one
wishes to explain, with the addition of the
word "power" or " faculty. "9
Wundt likewise places the same objectiqn:
The attempt to present a discriminating
desoription of the different psychical
processes, gave rise to the need of an
appropriate classification. Olass-concepts
were formed, under whioh the various processes were grouped; and the attempt was
made to satisfy the need of an interpretation in each partioular case, by
subsuming the oomponents of a given oompound process under their proper classoonoepts. Such conoepts are, for example,
sensation, knowledge, attention, memory,
imagination, understanding, and ~ill •••.
these derived psychioal conoepts may serve
for a first grouping of the facts, but
they contribute nothi~ whatever to the
explanation of these acts. Still,
empirical psychology has often been guilty
of confounding this description with explanation. Thus, the faoulty-pSYChOlo g
considered these class-concepts as psyc ical
forces or faculties, and referred psychical
processes to their alternating or united
activity.lO
tI

s

Vaihinger, however, wins the prize in his outline of

~he

objection; for besides giving a very clear statement of the
9 M. Dessoir, Outlines of the History of Psychology, Macmillan,
lew York, 1912, 170.
10 W. Wundt, Outlines of PsychOlogl, trl. by O.H. Judd,
Engelmann, Leipzig, 1897, 11.
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objeotion itself, he adds a suffioient amount of ridicule to

.'

make the statement interesting.
A whole series of well-known concepts, such
as "soul," "force," and the various "psychical
faoul ties, II etc., belong here. Al though these
conceptual constructs were formerly, and are
still today regarded as expressions for real
and existing entities, they are, in truth,
nothing but summational expressions for a
series of interconnected phenomena and interconnected processes •••• Bo more is stated in
these nominal fictions than what the single
phenomena could tell us themselves, and if
we believe that we bave understood or
actually said anything in using these words-a naive view that still surviv8s--we are
simply forgetting that these expressions are
purely tautological. l1

When thes8 and similar attacks are analyzed closely, it
is found that they really contain three separate objeotions:
first, that regardless what the faculties are olaimed to be,
they are in reality nothing but general ooncepts convenient for
the purpose of classification; second; that unfortunately they
have been hypostatized into real agents; and third, that, in
any oase, they offer no explanation of the psychio processes.
That the faculties are merely class conoepts is the
position long ago assumed by the Nominalists.

Hamilton, in

trying to defend faculties against those who would call the
faculties a series of "mannikins," declared that the faculties
were "nothing more than names determined by various orders of
11 H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As If', tr1. by O.K. Ogden,
Harcourt, New York, 1925, 212.

77

mental phenomena. RIB

Now if the faoulties are merely ~mes,

the obvious oonolusion is that the aotivity of the psyche is
merely called intellectual when it thinks, volitional when it
wills, memory when it remembers; but that in reality there is
no such thing as an intelleot, a will, a memory, and so on.
St. Thomas explioitly refutes this view, and shows that the
faoulties are B21 of the essenoe of the soul, as this objection
logioally demands that they be.
Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam posuerunt,
potentias animae non esse aliud quam ipsam
ejus essentiam; ita quod una et eadem assentia
animae seoundum quod est prinoipium sensitivae
operationis, dioitur sensus; secundum vero quod
est intellectualis operationis princ ipium ,
dioitur intelleotus; et sio de aliis ••.• Sed
haec positio est omnino impossibilis.1 3
The reason why St. Thomas rejeots this position, has already
been indioated in Ohapter II, pp. 8-11.
The seoond part of the objection is direoted against the
'fact' that these mere olassifioatory ooncepts have been hypostatized into real agents.

In answer to this, it is necessary,

in the light of what has just been said, to deny the
'suppositum'j namely, that the faoulties are "mere olassifioatory oonoepts."

Sinoe the faoulties are not mere olassifioatory

ooncepts but real existenoes, albeit essentially dependent on
12 Sir William Hamilton, Leotures on Metaphysios and Logio,
Gould & Lincoln, Boston, 1868, I, 269.
13 AqUinas, Vol. II, De Spiritualibus Oreaturis, Art. XI.
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the soul's sUbstanoe for existenoe , it is not neoessary., to
hypostatize them; they already exist.

As for their being hypo-

statized into real agents, it is neoessary but toreoall that
St. Thomas definitely did not oonsider the faoulties as real
agents, if by real agents is meant things possessing the power
of independent aotion.

If they oan be oalled agents at all,

and they oan, it is only in an analogous sense, such as the
agenoy of an instrument in the hands of an artist, the latter
being the prinoipal agent. 14
The third element of the oritioism is that the faoulties
offer no explanation of oonsoious prooesses.
To say that an individual mind possesses a
oertain faoulty is merely to say that it
is oapable of oertain states or prooesses.
To assign the faoulty as a oause, or as a
real condition of the states or prooesses,
is evidently to explain in,a cirole, or in
other wo~ds it is a mere failure to explain
at all. 1 t>
In answer to this objeotion, a distinotion is neoessary.
That the theory of faoulties does not give a quantative or
qualitive analysis of the processes of conSCiousness, oan be
conoeded.

That the theory of faculties offers no philosophtcal

or metaphysical explanation of the ultimate source of conscious
14 Ofr. Aquinas, De Anima, Art. XII, also r.x. Oalcagno, S.J.,
Philo sophia Soholastica, K. d'Auria, Naples, 1937, II, 17.
15

G.r.

Stout, A :Manual of Psychology, Hinds
1899, 104.

&

Nobel, New York,
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acts, a Thomist is forced to deny.

If through a procesiof

deduction a cause is assigned to a certain effect or group of
effects, there is offered at least a partial explanation of the
phenomena by assigning the source of their causation.

Moreover,

this cause or principle or agent producing the effeots must of
necessity be real and existing, because the effeot iB real and
existing.

Therefore the postulation of the soul as the prin-

ciple agent, and of the faoulties as the channels or instruments
of that agency, is simply a response to the demands of reason,
and, consequently,

~

offer at least a partial philosophio

explanation.
However, as intimated above, no intelligent soholastic
philosopher would claim that the ooncept of faoulty offers a
soientifio explanation of the processes of conscious acts.
Faculties assist in assigning the cause of conscious acts; they
do not attempt to explain the prooesses.

Explanation of the

process is a task that pertains more to science than to philosophy.

Sully saw the distinction but failed to draw the proper

conolusion.
The discussion of the ultimate nature of the
socalled faoulties and powers of the mind belongs to rational psyohology, or that branch
of philosophy which treats of mind as substanoe. The hypothesis of faoulties can,
however, be criticized from the point of
view of empirioal psychology in so far as
it succeeds or does not Buooeedl~n giving a
olear acoount of the phenomena.
16 Sully. 25-26.
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It is preoisely the failure of modern soientifio

p~yohol

ogiete to understand olearly the distinotion between philosophio
and soientifio psyohology, that has oaused them to berate the
faoulties for failure to offer the type of explanation that
they were never intended to offer.

Moreover, many of our

modern soientifio psyohologists unfortunately went to the
extreme in denying to the faoulties any explanatory power whatever, a position whioh, for reasons given above, must of
neoessity be rejeoted.
OBJECTION III

FACULTIES DESTROY THE UNITY OF THE SOUL

Explicit statements that the theory of faoulties destroys
the unity of the eoul are rather infrequent, yet many oritioisms
reductively allege that objeotion.

Thus, nearly all desoriptions

of faoulties as "pigeon holes," "oompartments," "parte of a
maohine," "oells of a storage battery," eto., implioitly oonoeive of them as oomponents of the mind, thus destroying the
essential unity of the mind.

The following is an example in

point, from Thorndike:
The mind is regarded as a maohine of whioh
the different faoulties are parts. Experienoe being thrown in at one end, perception
peroeives them, discrimination tells them
apart, memory retains them and so on ••• Or,
in a still cruder type of thinking, the mind
is a storage battery Which oan be loaded with
will power, or intellect, or judgment, giving
the individual 'a surplus of mind to expend.' 17
17 Thorndike, 236-237.

':
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This objection to the faculties as destroying the

~ity

of

the soul, when directed against certain "faculty psychologies,"
is not without some justification.

Kant appears to succeed

pretty well in departmentalizing the mind; and, acoording to
Ueberweg, Beneke, altbough opposed to the "innate abstract
'faculties of the soul'," beld that tbe truly elementary
,
faoulties "are the elements of the substanoe of the soul itself; [that] they are not inherent in a substratum distinot
from themselves.

A thing is only the sum of its own oombined

foroes."lS
However, when directed against the conoept of faculty
aocording to St. Thomas, this objeotion is baseless.

For St.

Thomas olearly shows that the faculties are 'acoidents', and
that it is the essential apptitude of an accident to exist in a
substance.

NOw, the addition of accidents to a substance does

in no way create a division in the substance or cause it to become multiple.

To anyone acquainted with soholastic terminology

this conclusion is obvious.

Oonsequently, the concept of faculty

in no way mars the essential simplicity of the soul.

On the

contrary, this concept of faculty, by accounting for the diversity of conscious acts without demanding that the ultimate prinCiple of these aots be itself diverse, in reality protects and
defends the soul's essential unity and simplicity.
lS Friedrioh Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, Soribner, Armstrong
& 00., New York, lS77, II, 2S6.
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OBJEOTION IV

FAOULTY PSYOHOLOGY HAS IMPEDED THE PROGRE§S
OF SOIENTIFIO PSYOHOLOGY

This is an objection that is hard to &nswer, because it
appears to be, at least to a certain extent, justified.

Faculty

psychology, especially the orthodox faculty psychology of the
St. Thomas, has a certain air of finality about it that tends
to discourage further research.

Oertain processes are attributed

to certain faculties,and that seems to end the matter; there
seems to be little else that need be or can be said about it.
On studying without favor or affection the
whole typical development of psychology as
based on the notion of faculties, it is
hard to resist the impression that these
have often been treated as if they supplied
psychology with its main end and brought it
to a full stop. When once any mental
operation has been assigned to and swallowed
up in its appropriate faculty, the last
word 1s taken to have been said about it.
In particular there is no further need
felt for either analysis or synthesiS. In
this way the determining of the faculties
has in good truth seemed to paralyse further
inquiry; it has left the science of the
psyche more or less stunted and ineffective. 19
This statement by Spearman is one which we might expect to have
been made by almost anyone but himself.

For besides being a"

generous defender of the "faculties," he has done perhaps more
than any other modern psychologist to develop the science of
psychology along solidly progressive lines.

He is undoubtedly

the finest modern example we have of one who did not waste his
19 Spearman, I, 193.

83

time, as so many others did, in opposing a faoulty
that is metaphysioally sound.

psyo.~logy

Rather he recognized the value

of the metaphysical explanation of the causation of conscious
phenomena, and then, as a true sCientist, prooeeded to analyze
oarefully the aotual processes of conscious phenomena.

Accord-

ingly, a criticism of such a nature, coming from such an
authority, demands more than the usual consideration.
A Thomistic psychologist is willing to admit that the
dootrine of faculties does possess an air of finality simply
because metaphysical solutions are supposed to be 'final'
(i.e., ultimate), else they would not be metaphysioal.

Un-

fortunately, however, too many psychologists for too long a
time did not realize that orthodox faoulty psychology is metaphysical and not scientific.

Faculty psychology in itself did

not so much discourage scientific research; it simply did not
bother about it, because such research was not necessary in
order to arrive at the metaphysical solutions at which the
philosopher was aiming.

The soientific psyohologists, however,

by negleoting to conduct extensive scientific research into
mental processes, failed to develop their science to any great
extent.

The cause, therefore, of lack of progress in scientific

psychology may be attributed not so much to the "finality" of
metaphysical faculty psychology, as to the failure of scientific
psychologists to develop their science by extensive and intensive research.

Fortunately, within the last few decades this
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research has been made.
progress.

Scientific psychology has

mad~'great

The result has been that contemporary psychology is

in a position to combine the best of philosophic thought with
the extensive date of scientific research, and thus to synthesize psychology into the discipline in which "the philosopher
makes his contribution by defining the essence of man, setting
forth the essential distinction of his powers, analyzing the
nature underlying his habits and acts; [and in WhiCh] the
sCientist makes his contribution by investigating the phenomenal
correlations among human operations, and discovering thereby
the material and accidental determinants of his habits and
powers. H20

20 R.E. Brennan, O.P., Thomistic Psychology, Macmillan, New York
1941, Introduction by Mortimer Adler, xi.
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OHAPTER VI
OONOLUSION
The problem as it was conceived at the outset was to determine, in view of the widespread opposition among the moderns to
the concept of mental faculty, whether the Thomistic Schoolmen
were propounders of philosophical nonsense and dispensers of
empty verbalisM in proposing a faculty theory, or whether the
moderns themselves were either erroneous or laboring under a
misoonoeption of the theory in repudiating it.

The findings

of this thesis seem to warrant the oonolusion that a large
portion of the opposition to the faoulty oonoept is rooted in
two prinoiple oauses, error and misoonoeption.
The prevailing nominalism running through modern nonsoholastio philosophy oombined with the peouliar dootrines of
the various philosophio systems, produced a conoootion of error
inoompatible with a "realistio" faoulty oonoept.

Whatever of

that oonoept remained subsequent to this diSintegration of

'" ..~

philosophy beoame either so mangled and distorted, or so
radioally ohanged, that it found little if any resemblanoe to
the Thomistio oonoept.

The predominant nominalism of later

writers, together with the distorted view they had of the
85

86

faculty concept, gave rise to misconceptions which in turn were
productive of the flood of ridicule heaped upon the faculty
concept.
Early modern philosophers, then, such as Descartes,
Spinoza, and Leibnitz, opposed the ThomistiC concept of faculty
because it was inconsistent with their oWn peculiar systems.
A large body of subsequent criticisms of the notion of faculty,
had it source not in any absurdity latent in the Thomistic
theory itself, but in the absurdities evident in caricatures of
the faculty concept.

Moreover, when psychology itself abandoned

philosophy, and substituted the physical and epiphenomenal for
the metaphysical, the Thomistic notion of faculty, which is
essentially metaphysical, was scrapped, and labeled antique,
naive, and at best meaningless.
This thesis made no attempt to establish the validity of
the Thomistic concept of faculty.

Its purpose was to examine

that concept in the light of the opposition against it.

As a

result of this investigation it seems safe to draw the conclusion that the Thomistic concept of faculty is as valid

tod~y

as

when it came from the pen of St. Thomas, and that most, if not
all, subsequent OPPOSition has done little or nothing to jar
it from the place it holds in the metaphysics. of the soul.

-

..
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~
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APPENDIX

Since the time of Herbart, who was supposed to have sounded
the death knell for faculty psychology, the moribund faculties
have been derided, abused, ridiculed, and ignored.
who referred to them was out of date.
was anathematized.

Any author

Any serious use of them

Yet somehow or other, without anyone's

even trying to present an organized defense, they have survived.
Thorndike, of Oolumbia University, in his extensive experimentation tried hard to disprove anything like a faculty psychology.

Spearman, on the other hand, using some of the exper-

imental data of Thorndike, the findings Which he himself had
made, and the data of other experimentalists, bas reached
conclusions from this vast range of experimental data, that have
proved on a purely scientific basis the validity of the theory,
whioh, on a metaphYSical baSiS, St. Thomas and the host of
earlier philosophers bad established oenturies before. l
The faculty psyohology propounded by St. Thomas is a
metaphysical or philosophical diSCipline.

"

Modern psyohology

1 An excellent outline of this modern experimental phase of
mental abilities is contained in O.A. Hart's, The Thomistio
Ooncept of Mental Faculty, Oath. Un1v. of Amerioa,
Washington, D.O., 1930, 119 sqq.
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revolted against philosophy largely because the only pa1losophy
it knew was the bewildering mass of conflicting modern philosophies.

For revolting against such prostitutions of human

knowledge, we can hardly blame them.

Divorced, therefore, from

the guiding and regulating influence of sound philosophy, the
modern experimental and scientific psychologists wandered about,
lost in the maze of their own research.

However, in recent

years scientific psychology, so long groping in the dark, has
begun to see the path to progress.

It has come to see that it

has much to gain by accepting the conclusions of correot philosophy.

Modern research correlated with sound metaphysics has

been found both to corroborate the conclusions of metaphysics
and to profit by the guiding influence of sound philosophy.
It is not to be supposed, of course, that metaphysics has
nothing to profit from the factual date of modern research.
Metaphysics is nothing if it is not an attempt to explain facts
in their ultimate causes.
to metaphysics.

Hence facts can always be of service

Of course, the fundamental aspects of the meta-

physics of the soul will not change, for they are based upon
the obvious facts of human nature, which were the same at the
time of the first philosopher as they will be at the time of
the last.

Nevertheless, the more detailed knowledge of human

experience presented by scientific psychology cannot help being
of assistance to metaphysics, which, if it is sound, should,
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when neoessary, alter its oonclusions in the light of

~nown

faots.
Soientific and philosophic psychology then, can be and
should be of immense assistance to each other, and there has
probably been no field of research where this has been and Will
be more olearly shown than in the field of "faoulty psychology."

.'
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